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INFORMED CONSENT FOR NEONATAL
CIRCUMCISION: AN ETHICAL AND LEGAL
CONUNDRUM
J. Steven Svoboda
RobertS. Van Howe
James G. Dwyer*

INTRODUCTION

Neonatal circumcision is the surgery most commonly performed on
children, yet reliable information regarding the surgery is not usually
made available to parents when they are asked .to consent to the
procedure for their newborn sons. Often, parents are simply presented
with a paper to sign permitting the physician to perform the surgery,
without any discussion of the health risks or alternatives. Many medical
professionals, medical ethicists and legal scholars now dispute the
1
advisability, and even permissibility, of circumcising newborn boys.
Margaret Somerville, a prominent Canadian medical ethicist, recently
went so far as to assert that neonatal circumcision constitutes assault
2
Numerous legal scholars have
under the Canadian criminal code.

* J. Steven Svoboda, J.D., Executive Director, Attorneys for the Rights of the
Child, Berkeley, California. RobertS. Van Howe, M.D., F.A.A.P., Department of
Pediatrics Marshfield Clinic - Lakeland Center, Minocqua, Wisconsin. James G.
Dwyer, J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor, William & Mary School of Law.
1. See generally R.S. Van Howe, Consent for Circumcision, 156 CAN. MED.
Ass'N J. 17 (1997); Jeremy Klein, Circumcision and Consent, 27 FAM. PRAC. NEWS
13 (1997); M.A. Somerville and D.M. Alwin, Lidocaine-Prilocaine Cream for Pain
during Circumcision, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 568 (1997); D. Keleti, LidocainePrilocaine Cream for Pain during Circumcision, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 568 (1997);
S. L. Bond, State Laws Criminalizing Female Circumcision: A Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
353 (1999); J. Smith, Male Circumcision and the Rights of the Child, in Netherlands
Institute of Human Rights (SIM), in SIM SPECIAL No. 21 To BAEHR IN OUR
MINDS. ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE HEART OF THE NETHERLANDS 47597 (1999) at http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/specials/simsp2Lasp (last visited
Nov. 12, 2000).
2. See S. Kirkey, Circumcising Baby Boys 'Criminal Assault': Ethicist Says
Society Must Consider Ban, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 17, 1997 at 1; see also
Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 45, 265{1)(a) (2000) (Can.) [hereinafter Criminal
Code of Canada].
61
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concluded that routine neonatal circumcision falls within the legal
definition of child abuse and violates children's civil and human rights
3
under national and internationallaw. Consent to a procedure that is per
se illegal is, of course, invalid regardless of the motives of the consenting
4
party. But even if it were legally and ethically permissible for parents to
authorize circumcision of their sons, empirical studies have shown that the
manner in which doctors typically obtain "informed consent" for neonatal
circumcision from parents falls far below the standard of care required of
5
the medical profession.
This article examines whether and when parental consent to
circumcision should be legally effective. It begins by identifying the legal
and ethical requirements for consent that apply when medical
professionals treat competent adult patients; requirements such as full
disclosure, adequate capacity to consent, and voluntariness. It then
analyzes how the rules and principles applicable in that context translate
into legal and ethical requirements for consent to treatment of
incompetent persons, and, in particular, treatment of children. It shows
that, under normal circumstances, medical professionals may not
prophylactically remove healthy tissue from even consenting adult
patients, and that as a general rule, parents, regardless of their religious
convictions, may not authorize medically unnecessary procedures on their
children. The article then assesses the implications of those requirements
for the practice of "routine circumcision" - that is, circumcision of infant
males born with normal genitalia. It concludes that, because routine

3. See
Smith,
supra
note
1,
at
http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/specials/simsp21.asp; see also C. Price, Male
Circumcision: An Ethical and Legal Affront, 128 BULL. OF MED. ETHICS 13 (May
1997); A.J. Chessler, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L. REV.
555 (1997); J. Steven Svoboda, Routine Infant Male Circumcision: Examining the
Human Rights and Constitutional Issues, in SEXUAL MUTILATIONS: A HUMAN
TRAGEDY 205-15, (G.C. Denniston and M.F. Milos, eds. 1997); J.G. Dwyer, The

Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education
Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 1321 (1996); C.A. Bonner & M.J. Kinane, Circumcision: the Legal and
Constitutional Issues, THE TRUTH SEEKER, at S1-S4 (July/Aug. 1989); W.E.
Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues, 23 J.
FAM. L. 337 (1985).
4. See, e.g., K.M. Harrison, Law, Order, and the Consent Defense, 12 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 477, 497 (2000).
5. See generally C. Ciesielski-Carlucci et al., Determinant of Decision-Making
for Circumcision, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 228 (1996).
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circumctston causes significant harm while providing no appreciable
medical benefits, parental consent to the procedure is invalid. If
circumcision can ever ethically and legally be performed, it is only when
the male reaches adulthood and is capable of deciding for himself to
undergo the procedure.
I.

THE PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE CONSENT TO SURGERY

The common law has always recognized battery- violation of a person's
right to be free from unwanted touching - as a civil and criminal wrong.
In this century, courts have increasingly emphasized the strong interest
each person has in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily
6
integrity. Subject to certain exceptions - such as, emergencies posing
threats to life or danger of grievous bodily harm, self defense, jostling in a
crowd and contact .sports - any willful touching of another person is
unlawful absent the valid consent of that person or of another person
7
authorized to consent on that person's behalf. If no valid consent exists,
8
even slight physical contact may give rise to liability.
Medical professionals can also be civilly and criminally liable for
wrongful violation of bodily integrity, as well as be subject to professional
9
disciplinary action. Surgery has long been recognized as a technical
battery that, regardless of the health-care provider's intentions, can be
10
excused only when there is express or implied consent from the patient.

6. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891);
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977).
7. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report No. 51, Consent to
Health Care of Young People 1:15 (1996).
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §
9 at 41-42 (5th ed. 1984).
9. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); Bonner
v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Queensland Law Reform
Commission, supra note 7, at 24-44; Family Law Council [of Australia],
Sterilization and Other Medical Procedures on Children-Discussion Paper 17-25
(Barton, ACT; Oct. 1993); J. Wilson, E. Della Torre and R. Ludbrook, My Body,
My Decision: Children's Consent to Medical Treatment-Discussion Paper
(Sydney: Mar. 1995).
10. See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Del. 1991) (holding
that an operation without informed consent constitutes battery); see also KEETON,
supra note 8, § 18 at 114; Criminal Code of Canada, supra note 2; Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93; Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122.
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As one landmark Canadian court decision held, "any intentional
nonconsensual touching which is harmful or offensive to a person's
11
reasonable sense of dignity is actionable. "
This is true even if the
treatment proves to be beneficial or even necessary to preserve a patient's
12
life.
Absent effective consent, liability arises simply from the act of
touching.
The consent requirement primarily protects the patient's bodily
13
integrity . In the case of competent persons, it also protects personal
autonomy. Because of the critical interests at stake, consent must be
"informed" in order to be valid: the individual must know to what he is
14
consenting. If the physician has not given the patient all the information
that the patient needs to make a knowledgeable decision regarding his
15
medical care, any consent the patient gives is ineffectual. The informed
consent requirement applies even to minor surgical procedures with
16
extremely slight risks, such as the removal of a wart.

II.
A.

ADULTS

How does consent work when the patient is a competent adult?

Competent adult patients are entitled to make the decisions regarding
17
their medical care themselves.
This uncontroverted principle is
fundamental to medical practice. The entitlement arises from the
principle of individual self-determination that lies at the core of our
18
political system and moral beliefs. To facilitate self-determination in the
medical setting, a process of "informed consent" has evolved.

11. MaJette v. Shulman [1990] 67 D.L.R. 4th 321, 327 (Can.).
12. See Matter of Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that a
competent adult has a common-law right to decline or accept medical treatment, a
violation of which right results in civil liability for those who administer medical
treatment without consent, despite fact that treatment may be beneficial or even
necessary to preserve patient's life).
13. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, supra note 7, at 15.
14. See Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wash. 1980).
15. See id.
16. Edward Etchells eta!., Bioethics for Clinicians: 1. Consent, 155 CAN. MED.
Ass'N J. 177 (1996).
17. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (1914); In
re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. 1990).
18. See PRISCILLA ALDERSON, CHILDREN'S CONSENT TO SURGERY 30 (1993).
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"[I]nformed consent is an autonomous authorization of medical
19
intervention. . . by individual patients."
Proper respect for the
individual patient and for his right to control his own life requires that
physicians refrain from surgical interventions, unless they are authorized
by the patient based on an understanding of the best available
20
information pertaining to a proposed procedure. In legal terms, securing
consent without providing adequate information constitutes legally
21
redressable negligence.
Thus, while patients necessarily rely on physicians to find the source of
22
a malady if there is one, once physicians have identified a problem and
delineated treatment options, the patient's right of consent requires that
the patient actively participate in the process of deciding which option to
choose. Accordingly, the physician has a legal and professional duty to
23
engage the patient in the consent process. Specific requirements for
informed consent have become increasingly stringent, reflecting modern
society's greater skepticism toward medical authority and increased
24
concern with safeguarding bodily integrity and personal autonomy.
Today those requirements fall into three categories: disclosure, capacity
25
and voluntariness.

1.

Disclosure

The duty of disclosure arises from the principle that an individual's
right to self-determination entails a right to know the truth and to receive

19. Tom L. Beauchamp & Ruth R. Faden, Informed Consent: II. Meaning and
Elements of Informed Consent, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1240 (Warren
T. Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995).
20. See Etchells et al., supra note 16, at 187.
21. See Bourgeois v. McDonald, 622 So. 2d 684, 688 (La. Ct. App. 1993); see
also K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. 1995); Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772,783 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U .S. 1064 (1972).
22. R.B. Deber et al., What Role Do Patients Wish to Play in Treatment
Decision Making?, 156 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1414, 1416 (1996); see also
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782; see generally L.A. Siminoff & J.H. Fetting, Factors
Affecting Treatment Decisions for a Life-Threatening Illness: the Case of Medical
Treatment of Breast Cancer, 32 Soc. Sci. & MED. 813 (1991).
23. See Etch ells et al., supra note 16, at 177-80.
24. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 793-94 ("physician's privilege to withhold
information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed . . . for
otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself.").
25. See Etchells et al., supra note 16, at 177-80.
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any and all information that is available, so that the treatment decision is
26
the individual's own decision rather than someone else's decision.
27
Patients have a relatively high desire for information. An uninformed
decision to follow the recommendation or suggestion of a medical
professional is in effect a choice coerced by the medical professional. In
addition to honoring the patient's right to self-determination, disclosure
facilitates the patient's ability to cope with the consequences of the
28
procedure chosen. In contrast, a patient's discovery after the fact that he
was not given all the information he would have wanted can undermine
his ability to deal effectively and positively with any adverse effects of the
29
procedure.
Medical professionals do not always fulfill this duty of disclosure, even
when treating competent adult patients, and with respect to some
procedures it may be common practice to give the patient much less
information than he or she would need to participate meaningfully in the
decision-making. Forty years ago, a physician might have been insulated
from liability for non-disclosure if this was the common and accepted
practice among medical professionals in connection with the particular
30
procedure. Today, a rule more respectful of patients prevails, requiring
disclosure of all information that the patient would deem relevant in
reaching a decision without regard to what the traditional common
. h as b een. 31
practice
Thus, before obtaining consent to a medical procedure, a physician
must provide adequate information to the patient in a manner that the
32
patient can comprehend. "Adequate" means the amount and kind of
information that the average person in the patient's position would want

26. See generally Philip C. Hebert et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 7. Truth
Telling, 156 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 225 (1997); Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 60607 (Cal. 1993) (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1,10-12 (Cal. 1972)).
27. See Deber et al., supra note 22, at 1417.
28. See ALDERSON, supra note 18, at 133, 155, 190.
29. See Mcinerney v. MacDonald (1992) 93 D.L.R. 4th 415,425-26 (Can.).
30. See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (Del. 1961); Bolam v.
Friern Hosp. Mgmt. Comm., 2 All E.R. 118, 118, 1 W.L.R. 582 (Q.B.D. 1957); P.
Parkinson, Children's Rights and Doctors' Immunities: The Implications of the
High Court's Decision In re Marion, 6 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 101, 123 (1992).
31. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 u.s. 1064 (1972).
32. See Edward Etchells et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 2. Disclosure, 155
CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 387 (1996).
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33

to have in reaching an informed decision. Typically this means that the
clinician must fully explain the proposed procedure, the expected shortterm risks and long-term consequences, the available alternatives and
their risks and benefits and the consequences of declining or delaying
34
treatment. The patient should be made aware of both short-term costsfor example, pain, length of confinement in a hospital, recovery time and
potential complications - and long-term costs - such as loss of functioning,
restriction of activities and physical scarring. In general, the test "for
determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to
35
the patient's decision." Physicians must disclose all material information,
that is, all "information which the physician knows or should know would
be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's position
36
when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure."
Importantly, the physician has an obligation to provide all significant
information that is available, even if he or she were previously unaware of
it. In other words, the duty of disclosure entails an obligation on the part
37
of the physician to acquire information as it becomes available.
Naturally, there is a limit to how much and what kind of information
medical professionals must provide. The physician's duty is to provide
information that the average person would need to make an intelligent
decision. This suggests that information that is not relevant need not be
provided. Relevant information is that which would have a bearing, from
38
the patient's perspective, on medical care.
The materiality criterion
suggests that physicians need not provide information that would not
influence the average patient's decision-making. However, even very
slight risks generally must be disclosed to patients, particularly if the
consequences may be severe. In a recent Australian case, for example, a

33. See id.
34. See id.; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782.
35. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972) (citing Canterbury, 464 F .2d at
786); see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (1990)
(following the "well-established principles" regarding informed consent first set
forth in Cobbs v. Grant).
36. Arata v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598,607 (Cal. 1993).
37. See American Medical Association [hereinafter AMA), CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 136 (1996).
38. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782; see also Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); see also Canadian Medical Association, Code of
Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association, 155 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 1176A
(1996).
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patient who underwent an elective operation on her right eye and who
had persistently questioned the physician concerning potential
complications was never informed that there was a one in 14,000 chance
that the operation would leave her blind. The operation did in fact leave
39
her virtually blind. The High Court of Australia ruled that the physician
was negligent in not revealing the risk of this complication, even though
40
the risk was slight. This ruling is consistent with patients' expectations; a
1988 study in Australia found that 77% of patients said that they wanted
41
more information about their treatment.
In addition to requirements as to the content of information provided,
a physician's duty of disclosure entails a requirement as to how he or she
provides the information: she must provide the requisite information in a
manner conducive to patient comprehension. Studies have found that
some form of written disclosure, either alone or in combination with
verbal disclosure, imparts greater knowledge than verbal disclosure
42
alone.
This suggests that physicians should provide full written

39. Rogers v. Whitaker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.).
40. See id. at 489-91.
41. Law Reform Commission of Victoria (Report 24), Australian Law
Reform Commission (Report 50), and New South Wales Law Reform
Commission (Report 62), Informed Decisions About Medical Procedures (1989) at

9.
42. See Helen Dunkelman, Patients' Knowledge of Their Condition and
Treatment: How It Might Be Improved, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 311, 311 (1979); see also
Barrie R. Cassileth et al., Informed Consent - Why Are Its Goals Imperfectly
Realized?, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 896, 896 (1980); S.A. Layton, Informed Consent
in Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery: a Study of Its Efficacy, 30 BRIT. J. ORAL &
MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 319, 319, 322 (1992); D. J. Byrne, A. Napier & A.
Cuschieri, How Informed Is Signed Consent?, 296 BRIT. MED. J. 839, 839-40
(1988); Hyman B. Muss et al., Written Informed Consent in Patients with Breast
Cancer, 43 CANCER 1549, 1549 (1979); H. J. Sutherland et al., Are We Getting
Informed Consent from Patients with Cancer?, 83 J. ROYAL Soc'Y MED. 439, 439
(1990); George Robinson & Avraham Merav, Informed Consent: Recall by
Patients Tested Postoperatively, 22 ANNALS OF THORACIC SURGERY 209, 209
(1976); Terence C. Wade, Patients May Not Recall Disclosure of Risk of Death:
Implications for Informed Consent, 30 MED., SCI. & L. 259, 259 (1990); Niels
Lynoe et al., Informed Consent: Study of Quality of Information Given to
Participants in a Clinical Trial, 303 BRIT. MED. J. 610, 612 (1991); S. Gibbs et al.,
Communicating Information to Patients About Medicine, 83 J. RoYAL Soc'Y MED.
292, 292 (1990); Kenneth D. Hopper & Harry N. Tyler, Informed Consent for
Intravascular Administration of Contrast Material: How Much Is Enough?, 171
RADIOLOGY 509, 509 (1989); G. Askew et al., Informed Consent: Can We Educate
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explanations of procedures to their patients when practicable.
Presumably, this would be practicable with respect to any procedures
performed routinely or in non-emergency situations.
Exceptions to the disclosure requirement, if any, are legally tenuous. A
patient may voluntarily forgo some elements of disclosure, but it is not
clear that this "waiver" provides the physician any protection from a
43
negligence suit.
The so-called "therapeutic privilege," adopted in the
past by the Supreme Court of Canada as sometimes permitting the
44
withholding of information in order to lessen the patient's suffering, is
increasingly disfavored, and, in fact, has more recently been ruled
45
unacceptable in that country. The High Court of Australia has similarly
ruled, "Except in those cases where there is a particular danger that the
provision of all relevant information will harm an unusually nervous,
disturbed or volatile patient, no special medical skill is involved in
[complying with legal mandates that require] disclosing the information,

Patients?, 35 J. R. C. SURGERY EDINB. 308, 308-09 (1990); Rose A. Gates et al.,
Patient Acceptance of an Information Sheet About Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
Options, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 679, 679 (1993); A.J. Tymchuk et al., Medical
Decision-Making among Elderly People in Long-Term Care, 28 GERONTOLOGIST
59 (June supp. 1988); P.J. D. Dawes et al., Informed Consent: The Assessment of
Two Structured Interview Approaches Compared to the Current Approach, 106 J.
LARYNGOLOGY & OTOLOGY 420, 420, 423 (1992); Irwin Kleinman et al.,
Effectiveness of Two Methods for Informing Schizophrenic Patients about
Neuroleptic Medication, 44 HOSP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 1189, 1189 (1993); S.
Layton & J. Korsen, Informed Consent in Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery: A Study
of the Value of Written Warnings, 32 BRIT. J. ORAL & MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY,
34, 34 (1994); R. J. Simes et al., Randomised Comparison of Procedures for
Obtaining Informed Consent in Clinical Trials of Treatment for Cancer, 293 BRIT.
MED. J. 1065 (1986); Etchells et al., supra note 29, at 38~-91.
43. Etchells et al., supra note 33, at 387-91.
44. See Reihl v. Hughes, (1980) 114 D.L.R. 3d 1, 15-17 (Can.); see also Hopp
v. Lepp, (1980) 112 D.L.R. 3d 67, 77 (Can.) ( "(A] surgeon has some leeway in
assessing the emotional condition of the patient and how the prospect of an
operation weighs upon him; the apprehension, if any, of the patient. . . [and] his
reluctance, if any, to submit to an operation .... "); Margaret A. Somerville,
Therapeutic Privilege: Variation on the theme of Informed Consent, 12 L., MED. &
HEALTH CARE 4, 11 (1984) (proposing that therapeutic privilege be seen as more
complex and sophisticated than previously envisioned, and that it be applied in
certain circumstances as a qualification of informed consent doctrine which may
prevent the latter from causing suffering disproportionate to the benefits it
confers.).
45. See Meyer Estate v. Rogers, [1991] 78 D .L.R. 4th 307,316 (Can.).
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46

including the risks attending the proposed treatment." By comparison,
the therapeutic privilege doctrine has never received much support in the
United States; just a smattering of lower courts have on rare occasions
47
endorsed it.
As early as 1972, in the leading case of Canterbury v.
Spence, the District of Columbia Circuit tersely observed that the
"physician's privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons
must be carefully circumscribed ... for otherwise it might devour the
48
disclosure rule itself." The rule is that physicians must provide accurate
and complete information to all patients, even though a small percentage
49
might prefer not to know about the risks of surgery. The only generally
recognized exception, which is narrowly construed, applies to situations
where, because of the patient's emotional condition, disclosure is very
50
likely to cause physical or mental harm.

2.

Capacity

Capacity is the patient's ability to understand information relating to
51
treatment decisions and to appreciate the consequences of a decision.
The capacity requirement reflects the belief that persons unable to make
rational decisions about their medical care should be protected from

46. See Rogers v. Whitaker, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479, 492 (Austl.).
47. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
u.s. 1064 (1972).
48. ld.; see also Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962)
(ruling that where a patient was in a fragile emotional state, concerned about the
operation, had previously experienced thyroidectomy, and a second gynecological
operation was to be performed simultaneously, the physician was not liable for
having failed to apprise the patient of all the hazards of thyroidectomy.); Hubert
W. Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient Sick
with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv, 349 (1946) (arguing for therapeutic
privilege, while conceding "there is little or no (U.S.] legal authority bearing on
the existence of such a privilege"); Marcella J. Mulvaney, The Therapeutic
Privilege: Defense in an Informed Consent Action, 42 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 63
(1996) (arguing that Arata v. Avedon resuscitated therapeutic privilege by holding
that physicians are not required to disclose statistical life expectancy information
to patients).
49. !d.; see also Roberts, 206 F. Supp. at 583; Mulvaney, supra note 48, at 63,
Smith, supra note 48, at 349.
50. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789; see also ELLEN I. PICARD, LEGAL
LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN CANADA 99 (2d ed. 1984).
51. See Edward Etchells et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 3. Capacity, 155 CAN.
MED. Ass'N J. 657 (1996).
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making decisions that are harmful or that they would not make if they
were able. The requirement imposes on physicians a duty to assess
whether a patient is capable of both understanding the relevant medical
information and making a rational decision based upon that information.
To accomplish this, the clinician should provide full disclosure about a
proposed procedure and then evaluate whether the patient does in fact
understand the information disclosed. In dealing with competent adults,
medical professionals must presume that the adult has the requisite
capacity and proceed with full disclosure unless and until they determine
that the patient is actually not capable of understanding. Non-disclosure
cannot be justified by a suspicion or uncertainty concerning the adult's
capacity for understanding.
Unfortunately, a patient's understanding is often limited not so much
by his inherent inability to comprehend, but by the clinician's inability to
convey information understandably. The capacity requirement precludes
doctors from obtaining consent without full disclosure based on the
doctor's determination of incapacity, where any incapacity can be cured
by reasonably improving the manner in which information is presented.
In fact, this requirement suggests a duty on the part of medical
professionals to make greater efforts to communicate information when
initial efforts are unsuccessful.
3.

V oluntariness

The voluntariness requirement protects the patient's right to make
52
health care choices free from manipulation or undue influence.
Manipulation occurs where medical personnel distort and/or omit
information in order to induce the patient's acceptance or rejection of a
3
procedure.5 Full disclosure can obviate manipulation by omission, but not
the danger of manipulation by distortion.
The power imbalance between doctor and patient creates a great
danger of undue influence. A patient cannot obtain treatment without an
agreeable medical professional, and typically can do little more than
respond to treatment proposals the physician offers. Patients are often ill
52. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 259 (1986).
53. See David A. Pendleton & Stephen Bochner, The Communication of
Medical Information in General Practice Consultations as a Function of Patients'
Social Class, 14A Soc. Sci. & MED. 669, 672 (1980); see also M.C. Shapiro et al.,
Information Control and the Exercise of Power in the Obstetrical Encounter, 17
Soc. SCI. & MED. 139, 144-45 (1983).
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and anxious at the time consent is sought, making them even more
vulnerable to influence by medical professionals. Because of the inherent
imbalance of power in the physician-patient relationship, the manner and
order in which physicians present information can greatly influence the
importance patients attach to different considerations and can,
intentionally or otherwise, persuade the patient to select the option
favored by the physician.
Therefore, the physician has a duty to distance himself as much as
possible from his personal preferences and values and to present
information in a manner that reflects an objective assessment of the
interests at stake for the patient. Physicians also must be sensitive to the
fact that patients are likely to interpret a suggestion, or even the mere
mention of an option, as a recommendation. To counteract this danger,
bioethicists recommend that physicians actively and explicitly encourage
54
patients to make decisions independently.
The timing of disclosure is also important. The immediacy of the need
for a medical procedure can interfere with the patient making a voluntary
decision. The patient may have little time to digest information and
reflect on alternatives; he or she is likely to be emotionally overwrought
and be especially reliant on the physician to make decisions for him or
her. Certainly with an elective procedure that can be performed at any
time, it would be inexcusable for a physician not to provide a patient with
full disclosure far in advance to allow the patient sufficient time to reflect
on whether to undergo the procedure.
In sum, an adult patient's decision to undergo a procedure must truly
be his or her decision, a true reflection of his or her autonomy and right to
self-determination. This will only be true if the physician fully and
objectively discloses all information relevant and material to the decision.
Doing so ensures that the patient understands the information,
encourages the patient to rriake the decision independently and steers
clear of any actions that could amount to undue influence and/or
. 1at10n.
. 55
mampu

54. See Edward Etchells et a!., Bioethics for Clinicians: 4. Voluntariness, 155
CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1083, 1086 (1996).

55. Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions: Cognitive
and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 72, 75 (1993); see generally Code of
Medical Ethics, supra note 33.
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How does informed consent work when competent adults request
non-medically indicated procedures?

A physician's obligation regarding the content of information provided
to a patient is even greater in connection with procedures, such as
cosmetic surgery, that are not "medically indkated," i.e., that are not
56
undertaken to secure a medical benefit. Because the procedure entails
no medical benefit, the only possible medical result is harm, so a physician
must proceed with particular caution.
The literature addressing consent for cosmetic surgery is fairly sparse;
the American Medical Association Code of Ethics, for example, does not
57
address it. However, a general principle running through the limited
discussion available holds that the more elective the procedure, the more
58
important the role of full disclosure. Because the patient is often eager
to proceed prior to consulting the physician, the physician needs to
temper this enthusiasm with a sobering enumeration of all possible
complications. The clear disclosure of all significant health considerations
is a prerequisite to the patient's ability to make a rational decision about
59
whether to proceed.
Naturally, the physician should also ensure that someone requesting a
procedure that is not medically indicated is fully competent and acting
voluntarily. It would be particularly troubling· if a physician not only
failed to ensure fully informed and uncoerced reflection on the potential
costs of a non-medically indicated procedure but also in fact suggested the
procedure or presented information about it in a way that could
reasonably be interpreted as a recommendation. Encouraging a patient
to undergo a procedure that has no medical benefit is presumptively
60
inconsistent with medical ethics.
A strong concern regarding voluntariness may arise in situations where
56. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACI'ICAL GUIDE
12-64 (2d ed. 1990); Alderson, supra note 18, at 188-99.
57. See AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 37.
58. See Ciesielski-Carlucci, supra note 5, at 229; see also Tekanawa v.
Millican, unreported Botting DCJ, Brisbane District Court, 11 February 1994, no.
1219-92; NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL PRACI'ITIONERS ON PROVIDING INFORMATION TO
PATIENTS 5, 5-6 (1993) (discussing a higher standard of disclosure of information is
required where surgery is purely elective or cosmetic).
59. Merilyn Evans, Augmentation Mammaplasty: Neither Simple Nor Safe, 8
AUSTL. J. ADVANCED NURSING 19,23-24 (1991).
60. See AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 37, at 134-35.
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the cultural practices of some group dictates that individuals undergo a
physical alteration that does not benefit them medically, particularly
where those individuals are subordinate within the group. Indeed, a
physician will often be ethically and legally barred from performing such
procedures that might cause harm and that are without medical benefit.
One example is a Muslim woman's request that a doctor circumcise her
daughter. Probably already covered by common law assault statutes, the
procedure is now specifically banned by a number of statutes passed in
the last few years. Any physician who performs such a procedure violates
61
medical ethics and, in many states, criminal and civil law as well.
Recently, a Seattle hospital agreed to perform a minor, largely symbolic,
genital cutting on a Muslim woman who requested it, but subsequently
62
reversed itself in the face of public outcry.
This event reflects the
widespread understanding that doctors should refuse to become complicit
in physically harmful cultural practices and that consent should be treated
with skepticism when it comes from persons who historically have been
less than fully autonomous. At least two authors have noticed the
dramatic disparity between the treatment of female genital cutting and
circumcision, commenting emphatically on the violation of equal
63
protection created by current statutory law.
61. See George Denniston, Circumcision and the Code of Ethics, 12 HUMANE
HEALTH CARE INT'L 78 (1996) (arguing that routine infant male circumcision
violates all seven principles of the American Medical Association's ethical code).
Laws passed in the United States against female genital mutilation include the
federal law (18 USC § 116) as well as numerous state statutes in California,
Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
Countries that have outlawed the practice include Burkina Faso, Canada, Central
African Republic, Cote d'lvoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya,
New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and the United
Kingdom. A complete list of all state and national laws with all citations appears IN
ANIKA RAHMAN AND NAHID TOUBIA, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO
LAWS AND POLICIES WORDLWIDE 101 (1999). See also Doriane L. Coleman, The
Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L.
REv. 717,751 (1998) (recounting the breakdown of "the Seattle compromise," in
which-despite the proposed procedure's apparent consistency with all pertinent
laws-public outcry prevented well-meaning doctors at one Seattle hospital from
performing even a ceremonial nick of Somali girls' clitorises which would remove
no tissue).
62. See Doriane L. Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural
Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L. REV. 717,736-37 (1998).
63. See Bond, supra note 1, at 371-74; see also Ross Povenmire, Do Parents
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Can adults consent to prophylactic removal of healthy tissue?

What if a procedure is not needed to correct an existing problem, but
might reduce or eliminate risk of medical problems in the future?
Current practices and attitudes with respect to risk of cancer in women
are instructive. Genetic tests can now detect genes that predispose
women to breast and ovarian cancer. Women with the relevant mutations
would significantly reduce the risk of contracting these cancers if they
underwent prophylactic mastectomy and/or oophorectomy.
These
women could thereby increase their lifespan by an average of 2.9 to 5.3
64
years.
Even in the average woman without these genetic markers,
prophylactically removing both breasts and ovaries would result in an
65
average gain of six to eight months in life expectancy. Without providing
their reasoning, the authors concluded that "prophylactic surgery is
66
obviously unreasonable for these women." Although such prophylactic
67
surgery is generally deemed inappropriate, given the substantial benefits
and assuming fully informed consent could be provided by the patient
herself, it may be legally and ethically permissible. By contrast, it clearly
would be impermissible in the case of an incompetent individual, where
68
permission would have to be provided by a surrogate.

D.

How does informed consent work in contexts involving
incompetent adults?

Although the doctrine of informed consent is predicated on respect for
the autonomy of the patient, the doctrine applies even when the patient is
not competent. The effect of applying the doctrine to incompetent adult
patients is not to give the physician or anyone else a right to decide for the
69
patient.
Rather, in such cases, under the principle of "substituted

Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal,
Healthy Tissue from their Infant Children?: the Practice of Circumcision in the
United States, 7 J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 113-14, 119-22 (1998).
64. See Deborah Schrag et al., Decision Analysis-Effects of Prophylactic
Mastectomy and Oophrectomy on Life Expectancy among Women with BRCAJ or
BRCA2 Mutations, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1465, 1465 (1997).
65. See id.
66. /d. at 1470.
67. See id. ("Prophylactic surgery is obviously unreasonable for these
women.").
68. See discussion infra Part II.E.
69. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,661-62 (N.J. 1976).
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judgment," a surrogate for the patient, typically a relative, is legally
permitted to stand in the place of the patient; this means that the surrogate
can make decisions on behalf of the patient in furtherance of the rights of
70
the patient. Surrogates are under a legal obligation to decide not on the
basis of how they want the patient to be treated, but rather on the basis of
how the patient would choose to be treated if he or she. were capable of
71
choosing. As a general rule, the more a surrogate seems influenced in

70. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 421, 431
(Mass. 1977); see also Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387-390 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1972) (declaring the right of court of equity to act for incompetent recognized as
"doctrine of substituted judgment" which is broad enough to cover all matters
touching well-being of legally incapacitated persons including infants); Strunk v.
Strunk 445 S.W.2d 145, 145-149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (permitting a kidney
transplant from 27-year-old incompetent to his 28-year-old brother based on
finding that incompetent, who had close relations with recipient, would benefit
from continuation of recipient's life); In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d
180, 181 (Wis. 1975) (denying request for court application of substituted
judgment doctrine and grant of permission for 39-year-old man with mental age of
12 to donate kidney to sister in absence of real consent on his part and in a
situation where no benefit to him had been established); Mark R. Tonelli,
Substituted Judgment in Medical Practice: Evidentiary Standards on a Sliding Scale,
25 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 22 (1997); L.E. Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures
Involving Minors and Incompetents and Misapplication of the Substituted
Judgment Doctrine, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 107, 107 (1992); Sean M. Dunphy & John
H. Cross, Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Persons: The Massachusetts
Substituted Judgment Model, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 153, 153 (1987); Charles H.
Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and
Procedural Protections for Medical Decision-Making within the American Family,
17 FAM. L. Q. 1, 16 (1983). But see William A. Krais, The Incompetent
Developmentally Disabled Person's Right of Self-Determination: Right-to-Die,
Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 333, 334-35 (1989)
(rejecting substituted judgment standard and recommending best interests test).
71. See Ex Parte Whitbread in the Matter of Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 ENG. REP.
878, 878 (Ch. 1816) ("the Court will act with reference to the Lunatic, and for his
benefit, as it is probable the Lunatic himself would have acted if of sound mind");
see also Belchertown, 370 N.E.2d at 424 ("decision in cases such as this should be
that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were
competent."); Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985) ("[the] goal of
decision-making for incompetent nursing home patients with respect to lifesustaining treatment should be to determine and effectuate, insofar as possible,
the decision that the patient would have made if competent."); Conservatorship of
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958
(1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 1023 (1988) (holding that incompetent patients
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her decision-making by her personal values and preferences, the less
willing a physician should be to accept the surrogate's authorization for a
procedure.
· Where the patient was formerly competent, the substitute decisionmakers typically must present clear and convincing evidence as to the
72
wishes of the patient before he or she became incompetent.
For
example, where a once-competent adult has become disabled by trauma
or old age and is on life support, in order for a court to authorize
discontinuation of life support surrogates must demonstrate that, when
competent, the patient indicated a preference not to have his or her life
73
prolonged by medical means if there was no hope of recovery. Where
such evidence is lacking or where the patient was never competent, the
surrogate must provide evidence as to what a rational person would likely
want for himself or herself in light of the relevant aspects of the
74
situation. In other words, the patient's best interests must be proved by
75
the surrogate. The substitute decision-maker's judgment is subject to
76
review and challenge if it appears irrational or self-interested.
retain right to have appropriate medical decisions made on their behalf, and an
appropriate medical decision is one that is made in the patient's best interests as
opposed to the interests of any other party).
72. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284-86 (1990)
(concluding that a state may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in
such proceedings and noting that many state courts which have addressed the
issue have required a clear and convincing standard of proof); cf Matter of Edna
M.P., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997) (using preponderance of evidence standard); see
also Lebit, supra note 70, at 107, 110, 127 (cautioning that substituted judgment
has been "tragically misapplied" to achieve what judges believe to be "beneficial"
in cases where consent is not available and noting that this results in the confusion
of the standards of best interests and substituted judgment).
73. See Matter of Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981); see also S. Williams,
Substituted Judgment in Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Persons: In re
Storar, 61 WIS. L. REV. 1173, 1173 (1982).
74. See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (N.J. 1981) (requiring clear and
convincing proof to justify sterilization of nineteen-year-old woman afflicted with
Down's syndrome).
75. See Matter of C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981) (requiring clear
and convincing standard); Matter of A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375-76 (Colo. 1981)
(requiring clear and convincing standard of proof that procedure "medically
essential"); Matter of Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Pa. 1982) (requiring clear
and convincing standard).
76. Neil M. Lazar et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 5. Substitute DecisionMaking, 155 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 1435 (1996).
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The question whether to perform a medical procedure on an adult who
has never been competent arises most often when mentally disabled
77
women have guardians who wish to sterilize them.
These guardians
typically believe that sterilization will benefit the disabled women by
preventing a pregnancy that could have serious physical, psychological
78
and social consequences. Nevertheless, in light of the presumption of
bodily integrity and the difficulty of attributing contrary preferences to an
adult who has never been competent, courts and legislators have become
79
increasingly unwilling to allow such sterilization.
In general, to authorize surgery on an incompetent adult patient, a
surrogate must clearly demonstrate that the benefits of the surgery
outweigh the short- and long-term costs for the patient. The incompetent
person's presumptive right against invasion of his or her bodily integrity
places the burden on anyone who would infringe that right to prove that it
is necessary for the incompetent person's welfare. Importantly, the costs
and benefits relevant to an assessment of an incompetent person's
interests in connection with a medical procedure are only temporal,
earthly interests such as physical and mental health, social relationships
and finances. Assessment of costs and benefits on behalf of an
incompetent person cannot justifiably include what the surrogate
decision-maker believes to be spiritual or other worldly costs and benefits
for the patient. There is no assurance that the patient would share that
perception. The law gives no one authority to decide what another
person's spiritual interests are, regardless of whether the latter person is
80
or ever has been competent. This principle is rarely tested, but in In re
81
Quinlan, which involved a once-competent woman in a persistent
vegetative state, the New Jersey Supreme Court invoked the principle to
reject a claim by the woman's parents that the hospital must withdraw life
support because the claim was inconsistent with the parents' religious

77. See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 311-12 (Ala. 1979) (holding that in
absence of statutory authority, court lacks power to order sterilization of retarded
16-year-old female); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366-67 (Conn. 1978)
(finding that parents lack authority either to veto or to give valid consent to
sterilization of their several mentally retarded and physically handicapped
daughters).
78. See Hudson, 373 So. 2d at 311-12; Ruby, 452 F. Supp. at 366-67.
79. See Hudson, 373 So. 2d at 311-12; Ruby, 452 F. Supp. at 366-67.
80. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,661-62 (N.J. 1976).
81. Jd.
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values. The court stated emphatically that the parents had no right,
based on religious freedom or parenthood, to make that decision for their
83
daughter.
Within these constraints the surrogate is legally authorized to grant
permission (the more precise terminology) to medical intervention for an
incompetent adult. However, for a competent adult making decisions
regarding his own care, such permission must be informed. The
physician's professional and legal duties in this context are at least as
stringent as in the case of an autonomous adult. Because the patient-the
person with the greatest stake in the operation-is not able himself to
insist upon receiving and then evaluating all the relevant information,
more care must be taken to ensure that decisions are made in the correct
way. Hence, when a surrogate is faced with a decision on whether an
incompetent adult should undergo surgery, medical personnel have a duty
to the patient to fully disclose to the surrogate all available information
that a reasonable, competent adult would want before deciding whether
84
to undergo the procedure. Physicians also have a duty to ensure that the
surrogate is capable of understanding the information provided and of
fully appreciating the consequences of a decision at the moment of
decision-making. Likewise, physicians also have an obligation not to
manipulate the surrogate by presenting the information in a manner
designed to secure permission, rather than facilitating an objective
evaluation of the risks and benefits of the procedure. In addition to these
requirements, which also arise in securing informed consent from a
competent patient, a physician seeking permission for a surgical
procedure on an incompetent adult must ensure that the substitute
decision-maker is not acting out of self-interest but rather is deciding on
the basis of what is best for the patient.

E.

Would non-medically indicated surgery be allowed for a nonautonomous adult?

There are few situations in which a surrogate for an incompetent adult
requests a non-medically indicated procedure. The most common are
similar to the cases indicated above in which a concerned family member
seeks to withdraw life support from a patient who is terminally ill or in a

82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parents' Right, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1416-21, 1429-32 (1994).
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persistent vegetative state, or to take away a mentally disabled woman's
85
ability to procreate. In all of these situations, the surrogate may perceive
non-medical benefits for the patient that he or she believes outweigh any
medical harm that might result from the decision. However, there is no
assurance that the views of surrogates, often close family members, will
necessarily be the same as the patient's had he or she been confronted
86
with the situation while competent. As noted above, surrogates in both
cases must present strong evidence as to the patient's preferences when
competent or as to the patient's best interests.
With respect to the choice of physically invasive procedures, such as
sterilization, courts and legislatures have been increasingly resistant to
allow them and increasingly concerned that surrogates might choose such
procedures out of self-interest rather than out of respect for the
incompetent adult.
In several states, sterilization is simply not
87
permitted. A doctor today who performs a sterilization operation on an

85. See Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to
the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from the Infant Children?: the
Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 87,
107-08 (1998) (emphasizing the strong similarity between sterilization of
incompetents and infant circumcision: both involve surgery on the genitals, since
incompetents are treated by the law as minors the parens patriae power applies
equally to incompetents and infants, both procedures viol'ate the minor's personal
integrity, and while sterilization invokes profound privacy interests in procreative
choice not raised by circumcision, circumcision "does involve the radical alteration
of a male's most sensitive and private body part which is surely a protected
privacy interest.").
86. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285-86 (1990).
87. In some States, sterilization is prohibited by statute where a mentally
disabled woman is capable of participating in the decision making process and
declines to consent. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-128(4) (2000). In at
least one state, California, the legislature initially passed a statute prohibiting
sterilization under any circumstances, but a court ruled the prohibition
unconstitutional, on the grounds that incompetent women have reproductive
rights that include a right to be sterilized if they want to be and if that is in their
best interests. See In re ValerieN., 707 P.2d 760, 771-72 (Cal. 1985) (invalidating
Ann. Cal. Probate Code § 2356(d)). More commonly, courts have held that
sterilization of mentally incompetent women is prohibited in the absence of
statutory authority. See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 126 (1996);
Elizabeth Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights
and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L. J. 806, 817 n.32 (1986). States that do permit
courts to authorize sterilization generally require that courts find by clear and
convincing evidence that sterilization is in the best interests of the incompetent
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incompetent woman without court approval is vulnerable to criminal, civil
and professional ethics charges, despite having permission from the
88
woman's parents or other guardians. Typically, if a court chooses to
grant approval of the procedure at all, it is only after a determination
"that the condition of the conservatee 'requires the recommended course
of medical treatment,"' and that there are no alternative means of
89
protecting the incompetent woman's physical well-being and interests.
Consistent with this approach, the California Supreme Court found in
90
Conservatorship of Valerie N. that parents of a mentally retarded woman
could not have her sterilized, "inasmuch as there was neither evidence of
necessity ... nor sufficient evidence that less intrusive means ... [were]
91
not presently available to [the conservatee]."
The Court based its
decision upon the incompetent patient's fundamental "right ... to be free
92
of intrusive medical and surgical procedures."
Unsurprisingly, courts have not been faced with claims by guardians to
have incompetent adults in their care undergo surgery to remove a
normal healthy, non-diseased, uninjured part of the body simply for the
sake of conforming to cultural norms or as a prophylactic measure to
avoid some infinitesimal risk of disease to that part of the body. Were a
guardian of an adult to seek such a procedure, doctors and lawyers would
inform him without hesitation that his request is inappropriate and legally
unsupportable. Imagine, for example, Muslim parents of a woman who
was never competent asking a doctor to circumcise her; the doctor surely
must refuse. Courts have even been hesitant when removal of healthy
tissue has been sought for the purpose of transplantation- that is, to
provide a medical benefit to (perhaps even save the life of) another
person who may be a close relative of the incompetent adult. They have

woman. See Scott, supra, at 817-19. Many require that all less drastic
(rtonpermanent) contraceptive methods have been found unworkable and that
there be no alternative to sterilization. See id. at 820 n.43. Significantly, current
law precludes courts from considering the interests of parents or other guardians
for the incompetent woman in deciding whether to authorize sterilization. See id.
at 821-22.
88. See ReB (a Minor), 2 All E.R. 206, 206, 214-15 (H.L. 1987); see generally
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-86.
89. See Valerie N., 707 P.2d at 771-72 (citing Ann. Cal. Probate Code §
2356(d) (1980)) (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 405.
92. See id. at 403.
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held that surrogates may not authorize this type of removal because it
93
does not constitute medical treatment for the incompetent donor. In
many such cases, an objective analysis would probably show that a
transplant would maximize the overall good and that the average
competent person would altruistically agree to donate the tissue or organ,
but the law nevertheless prohibits that result because of grave concerns
about violating a person's physical integrity without his consent.
The American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics does not
address a physician's ethical obligation in situations where guardians for
an incompetent adult seek non-medically indicated medical intervention.
However, the Code includes a more general mandate to physicians to help
patients "make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent
94
with good medical practice." This might be read to imply that a physician
must discourage a surrogate from seeking a procedure that would not be
medically beneficial to the patient. Certainly, physicians have no
affirmative obligation to undertake a non-medically indicated
intervention when asked to do so. Therefore, it is no justification for
violating an incompetent person's physical integrity that a surrogate asked
95
the physician to do so.
There is also little mention in the legal or ethical literature of
physician's proposing non-medically indicated procedures to surrogates
who have not themselves requested the procedure. This is unsurprising.
Such a practice would so clearly offend the canons of ethics of the medical
profession as to generate a reaction of horror and recrimination by legal
and medical authorities. The prohibition of solicitation by doctors, based
upon the impropriety of a physician putting his or her financial welfare
96
above the welfare of the patient, would apply even more stringently to
solicitation of surrogates for incompetent adults than it does to
solicitation of competent adults. Any physician who proposed to a
surrogate for an incompetent adult that the surrogate grant permission for
non-medically indicated surgery which the surrogate had not requested
would jeopardize his or her license to practice medicine.
93. See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 493-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re
Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 185-87 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
94. See AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 37, at 120 (emphasis
added) .
95. Charles Weijer et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 16. Dealing with Demands
for Inappropriate Treatment, 159 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 817 (1998).
96. See AMA, supra note 37, at 105; Can. Med. Ass'n, supra note 38, at
1176A-B.
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Ill. CHILDREN

A.

How does consent currently work in contexts involving children?

Parents traditionally have made most medical decisions for their minor
children.
Like surrogate decision-making for incompetent adults,
parental permission for medical procedures on children, when
appropriate and properly secured, constitutes an exception to the general
97
requirement of personal consent to medical treatment. Except in an
emergency, informed permission by parents is generally required to
perform any medical procedure on a child; otherwise, the procedure
98
would be tortious and probably a criminal assault.
In turn, the authority of parents is circumscribed by the welfare of their
children; they may not make decisions for their children that are likely to
cause them physical harm or otherwise impair their healthy
99
development. As the rights of children as distinct persons have been
increasingly recognized in modern times, children's welfare has become
an overriding constraint on their medical care, limiting parental
100
discretion. The Queensland Law Reform Commission forcefully stated
the limits on parental power to grant permission for children's medical
treatment as follows:
A parent has no authority to consent to the medical treatment
of his or her child unless it is in the best interests of the child.
This is because implicit in parental consent is understood to be
the determination of what is best for the welfare of the child. If
a parent purports to consent to a treatment which is not in the
best interests of the child, the consent is of no effect and any
person acting on such consent would be guilty of assault if any
101
physical interference is involved.
97. See Secretary, Dept. of Health & Comm. Serv. v. J.W.B. & S.M.B.
[Marion's Case] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 218,235-237 (Austl.).
98. See Keeton, supra note 8, at § 18; Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122
(D.C. Cir. 1941); see also Linda S. Ewald, Medical Decision-Making for Children:
An Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 689,689 (1982).
99. See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 1355; Bonner & Kinane, supra note 3, at S1S2.
100. See Marion's Case, 175 C.L.R. at 240; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 167 (1944).
101. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, CONSENT TO MEDICAL
TREATMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE: DISCUSSION PAPER 34-35 (1995) (internal
citations omitted).

84

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

[Vol. 17:61

Today, courts clearly have power to insert themselves into decision102
"Under the doctrine of parens patriae,
making on behalf of children.
the state has a right, indeed a duty, to protect children. State officials may
interfere in family matters to safeguard the child's health, educational
103
Thus, the principal limit on
development and emotional well being."
parents' decision-making is a legal and moral requirement that they act in
the best interests of their children, which triggers state action when
parents demonstrably act contrary to interests of the child, as defined by
the state.

B.

Parents may not sacrifice their children's physical well being for
the sake of religious belief

When parents make decisions about their children's medical care that
are inconsistent with their children's well-being-that is, decisions not
within the range of reasonable alternatives-they commit child abuse or
neglect and can be charged accordingly in civil and/or criminal
proceedings. Just as is true of adult incompetents, surrogate decisions for
children must rest on the temporal interests of the patient, not on
supposed spiritual or other worldly interests of the patient or of the
surrogate. Thus, parents are neither excused from their obligation to
secure necessary medical care for their children nor from their obligation
to protect their child's physical integrity from unwarranted medical
procedures simply because they have religious beliefs inconsistent with
104
the child's temporal well being.
102. See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 1355; see also J.L. Rosato, Putting Square
Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith Healing
Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parent, 29 U.S. FED. L. REV. 43
(1994).
103. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
104. See id.; see also In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1389 (Ohio 1986)
(ruling that parents' constitutional rights must yield to state authority because
"the faith of the parents, as firm and clear as it is, does not permit them, under the
law of this state and the nation, to expose [their child] to progressive ill health and
death); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. 1983) (finding that "humane
considerations and life-saving attempts" in favor of child outweighed father's
interest in unlimited practice of his religion); People ex rei. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271
(Colo. 1982); (holding that when parents refuse medical treatment for their child
on religious grounds, the state can meet its heavy burden of proof necessary to
override parents' constitutional objections by demonstrating that the child is
suffering from a life-threatening medical condition for which there is medical
treatment available); In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53, 57-59 (Fla. 1975) (concluding that
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Numerous judicial decisions have addressed parental power to refuse
medically indicated procedures that are contrary to parents' religious
beliefs. The reigning legal principle was announced by the United States
105
Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts: "Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
106
choice for themselves."
This principle is controlling regardless of
whether the child's life is in danger: parents are always required by law to
107
proceed in accordance with their child's best interests.
In fact,
sometimes courts do not require any actual harm to justify compelling a
108
medical procedure that parents have refused on religious grounds. The
prevailing rule is that the state properly overrides parental objections to
109
care when necessary to avoid physical harm to the child. For example,

the court is not precluded in case where child's life is threatened from ordering
medical services or treatment even where contrary to parents' wishes); Jehovah's
Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 505 (W.D. Wash. 1967)
(finding that state statutes empowering superior court judges to declare children
dependent for purpose of authorizing blood transfusions of children against
parents' religious objections not invalid under United States Constitution), affd
per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Paterson, 320 A.2d 518
(N.J. 1974) (ordering necessary blooci transfusions for child when parents' refusal,
based on religious beliefs, created danger of grave and irreparable brain damage
but not death); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio 1962) (concluding that
"when a child's right to live and his parents' religious belief collide, the former is
paramount, and the religious doctrine must give way"); Commonwealth v.
Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. 1985) (deciding that for purposes of
involuntary homicide statute, parents had no choice but to get medical help,
despite their religious beliefs, where they faced condition which threatened and
eventually ended child's life).
105. 321 u.s. 158 (1944).
106. !d. at 170.
107. See, e.g., O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); In re
Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d 620
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1976); In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972); In re Sampson,
317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970), affd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div.
1971), affd, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972).
· 108. See In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling
that despite absence of actual harm, threat of harm if child was not periodically
monitored for cancer was sufficient to permit juvenile court's jurisdiction to order
monitoring).
109. See generally In re McCauley, 565 N.E .2d 411 (Mass. 1991) (ruling that
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10

in Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital/ the United States
Supreme Court, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, upheld per curiam a
Washington federal district court decision that the State of Washington
properly ordered necessary blood transfusions for a child whose parents
objected to the transfusions on religious grounds.m
Moreover, in recent years the very notion of parental entitlement has
been increasingly questioned. Recognition of and respect for children as
persons distinct from their parents has grown, leading legal scholars and
judges to insist that parenthood is a fiduciary role rather than a propertyowning one, so that parental authority should be viewed as a limited
112
privilege rather than as a right. In addition, there has been growing
support for the view that children themselves possess rights in connection
113
with their upbringing, and that those rights constrain the freedom of
114
parents as well as the power of the state.

best interests of child, coupled with state's strong interest in securing a life-saving
blood transfusion, outweighed parents' constitutional objections); State v.
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (holding
court-ordered blood transfusion did not violate parents' constitutional rights of
religion or parental autonomy when the child's life was in danger); Wallace v.
Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (finding that
when parents refuse medical treatment for their child, the lack of which will
almost certainly cause death or, at best, lifelong mental impairment, the child is
neglected and the court may order the necessary treatment without violating the
parents' constitutional rights); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952)
(holding that state has power to preserve child's life and health when medical
treatment is as necessary for that child's survival as is food); Commonwealth v.
Cottam, 616 A.2d 988, 1000 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (ruling that in criminal case
against defendant parents over death of children due to neglect, validity and
sincerity of religious beliefs of defendants and children are not relevant to issues
presented in trial for failing in legal duty to provide for children, resulting in
starvation death of son and severe malnutrition of daughter); see generally Dwyer,
supra note 3, at 1355-56.
110. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.O. Wash. 1967), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598
(1968).
111. Jd. at 504-05.
112. See W. Riddick, Parents and Life Prospects, in HAVING CHILDREN:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 25 (0. O'Neill & W.
Riddick eds. 1979); see generally Dwyer, supra note 84, at 1374-76.
113. JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS 37 (1984); see generally JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V.
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998).
114. See James G. Dwyer, supra note 84, at 1429-31; see also Josette M.
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In light of the established limits on parental authority and freedom and
the current trend toward greater protection of children against
inappropriate parental decision-making, medical personnel cannot simply
comply with parental preferences for, or against, a given procedure even
when those preferences are grounded in religious belief. As with
incompetent adults, the physician owes duties to the child patient himself
and those duties in some circumstances require resisting or even refusing
LeDoux, Interspousal Liability and the Wrongful Transmission of HIV-AIDS: An
Argument for Broadening Legal A venues for the Injured Spouse and Further
Expanding Children's Rights to Sue Their Parents, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 392
(2000) ("the trend in recent law is to recognize a growing need to grant children
new rights in order that they may seek legal redress from transgressing parents");
see also Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making For and By Children:
Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 312 (1994)
(noting that "the new cycle of litigation involving children reflects an additional
pattern of greater state involvement in protecting children, an intervention which
can pose a significant intrusion into family life"). For a sampling of law review
articles in recent years arguing for greater rights of children as against their
parents in particular contexts, see Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our
Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of
Children, 36.31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353 (1998) (arguing that children have a
right not to be corporally punished by their parents); Marsha Garrison, An
Evaluation of Two Models of Pareiual Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REv. 41 (1998)
(arguing for a right of children to a greater share of family resources following
divorce than they currently receive); Elizabeth A. Lingle, Treating Children By
Faith: Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 301, 330 (1996) (arguing
against spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical neglect laws); Ann
MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care DecisionMaking for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
725, 739 (1994) (arguing against spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical
neglect laws); Therese Powers, Race For Perfection: Children's Rights and
Enhancement Drugs, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 141, 165-167 (1998-99) (arguing for a right
of children to receive Ritalin and Human Growth Hormone despite the objection
of their parents); Melinda A. Roberts, Parent and Child in Conflict: Between
Liberty and Responsibility, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 485 (1996)
(arguing for greater liberty rights for children as against the interests and wishes of
parents in a variety of situations). For evidence of the medical professions
commitment to protecting the welfare of children even as against the wishes of
parents in other contexts, see American Academy of Pediatrics, Religious
Objections to Medical Care, 99 PEDIATRICS 279, 279 (1997) (stating AAP
opposition to spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical neglect laws);
Andrew Skolnick, Religious Exemptions to Child Neglect Laws Still Being Passed
Despite Convictions of Parents, 264 JAMA 1226, 1233 (1990) (stating opposition
of AMAto spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical neglect laws).
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115

surrogates' choices.
Those duties may be conceptualized as requiring
medical professionals to ensure that parents are making the same decision
that the child would make if able to do so, or as requiring medical
professionals to ensure that parental choices are consistent with what
objectively is in the child's best interests. In other words, the professional
obligation owed to a child patient is the same as that owed an
incompetent adult patient.

C.

Parents may authorize a non-medically indicated procedure only
if it is clearly in the child's best interests

Where parents request a procedure that is not medically indicated,
courts have taken an even more child-protective stance and required
strong evidence that the procedure is in the patient-child's interests.
Sometimes courts allow the child's best interests to be determined using
116
the more subjective, substituted judgment standard. On other occasions
courts insist on the more objective, "best interests" approach, presumably
because the substituted judgment approach might allow parents
inappropriately to inject their own preferences into the decision-making
117
process.
While theoretically clear, the distinction between the two standards has
a definite tendency to sometimes blur in practice, as courts have
demonstrated by invoking the "best interests" language while applying an
analytical approach more consonant with the substituted judgment
118
approach. As with incompetent adults, courts do not permit procedures

115. See Christine Harrison et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 9. Involving
Children in Medical Decisions, 156 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 825,827-828 (1997).
116. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148-149 (Ky. 1969); Little v. Little,
576 S.W.2d at 497-98; Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d at 387-88; Foody v. Manchester
Mem. Hasp., 482 A.2d 713, 720-21 (Conn. Super. 1984); In re Estate of Longeway,
549 N.E.2d 292, 298-300 (Ill. 1989).
117. See Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hasp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1253-54
(Md. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983) (applying best interests doctrine to
bar sterilization of an incompetent thirteen year old girl); Curran v. Bosze, 566
N.E.2d 1319, 1325-1331 (Ill. 1990); see generally Re Jane (1988) 85 A.L.R. 409
(holding parental consent by itself insufficient to authorize hysterectomy on
severely mentally disabled but physically healthy seventeen-year-old woman
despite apparently good-faith desire to protect her from problems in coping with
menstruation and possible pregnancy); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 483-86 (N.J.
1981); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
118. See, e.g, Matter of Doe, 104 A.D.2d 200, 200-01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
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to be performed on children when the procedures will only benefit other
119
people and not the patient.
This is true even in cases where the
potential benefit to a close relative substantially exceeds the risk to the
child-patient, and where one might therefore reasonably assume many
competent patients would choose to undergo the procedure. For
120
example, in Little v. Little the guardian ad litem for a 14-year-old
mentally incompetent, but otherwise perfectly healthy girl applied on the
encouragement of the girl's mother for an order authorizing the mother to
121
grant permission for the removal of a kidney from the girl. The purpose
of the procedure was to transplant the kidney into the girl's brother who
was suffering from end-stage renal disease. In refusing the request, the
Texas Court of Appeals stated that "[t]his power of parents ... to consent
to surgical intrusions upon the person of the minor ... is limited to the
(applying substituted judgment analysis to uphold trial court's finding "to
reasonable certainty" that bone marrow transplant was in incompetent donor's
"best interests" due to benefits of future company and advocacy provided by
donee brother's companionship, which were found to outweigh any physical and
psychological risk); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1202 (Ill. 1990)
(involving petition for leave to discontinue artificial feeding and hydration of ward
in chronically vegetative state, a determination by anyone else of best interests of
ward cannot govern . ward's imputed choice; if this were permissible, "the
substituted-judgment procedure would be vitiated by a best-interests guardianship
standard, elevating other parties' assessments of the meaning and value of life
over the affected individual's own common Jaw right to refuse medical
treatment"); see also Lebit, supra note 70, at 108 ("Over time courts have come to
confuse the best interests standard with the substituted judgment doctrine in
certain situations and apply the substituted judgment doctrine to cases in which it
is not appropriate").
119. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121,123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (concluding that
skin graft from 15-year-old boy performed without informed consent from him or
his mother was entirely for the benefit of the graft recipient and involved sacrifice
by the boy, violating the basic consideration of whether the proposed operation is
for the benefit of the child); see also In reA. C., 573 A.2d at 1247 (finding that to
protect right to bodily integrity against intrusion by others, courts must determine
the patient's wishes by any means available and must abide by these wishes unless
truly extraordinary or compelling reasons exist to override them); see generally
Krais, supra note 70, at 333-361 (rejecting substituted judgment standard and
recommending best interests test); see also Lebit, supra note 70 at 111-12; L.K.
Gregory, Propriety of Surgically Invading Incompetent or Minor for Benefit of
Third Party, 4 A.L.R. 5th 1000 (1992); Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment
Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 131 (1985).
120. 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
121. See id. at 493-95.
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122

power to consent to medical 'treatment."'
In other words, the
permission is limited to care for an injury, disease or malformation.
23
Similarly, in In re Richardson/ a Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled that
kidney transplant surgery from a mentally retarded child to his sister
could not take place because it would contravene the "minor's right to be
free in his person from bodily intrusion to the extent of the loss of an
124
organ unless such loss be in the best interest of the minor."
The
Richardson court rejected the substituted judgment test in favor of the
best interest test and concluded that the procedure was not in the
prospective donor's interest, because any direct benefit was highly
126
125
speculative.
In Curran v. Bosze, the Illinois Supreme Court likewise
rejected the substituted judgment approach in a case involving a proposal
to subject three-and-one-half-year-old twins to blood testing to determine
bone marrow compatibility with their half-brother, who was dying of
leukemia, reasoning that it was impermissibly speculative for a court of
law or anyone else to attempt to ascertain the future intentions of such
127
young children.
Most recently, and in a dramatic endorsement of the
best interests principle, an English Court of Appeals refused to allow
parents of Siamese twin girls to undertake the separation of the twins,
where one severely brain-damaged twin was virtually sure to die as a
result of the procedure, but where in the absence of the procedure both
128
twins would almost certainly lose their lives within a few years.
The
court held that parental consent may only be given for treatment which is
in the best interests of the child, and that in this case the treatment was
129
not in the weaker child's best interest.
Parents, like substitute decision-makers for incompetent adult patients,
should be viewed as agents for their children, required to make decisions
regarding medical interventions for their children in a manner consistent

122. See id.
123. 284 So. 2d 185.
124. See id. at 185-87.
125. See id. at 187; but cf Matter of Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
126. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
127. See id. at 1325-31.
128. A (Children), Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil
Division), at§§ 11.7 and 11.8, http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/info/news_items/
siamese.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
129. /d. at §§ III.3 and III.S.
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130

with their children's best interests. Medical professionals owe a duty to
their minor patients to assist parents in making decisions that conform to
that standard. A recent statement of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (AAP) Committee on Bioethics supports the conclusion that
physicians are constrained in accepting parental direction regarding
medical care for children by the requirement that the care be medically
beneficial and that any surgery upon children must be necessary to
prevent serious harm. According to the AAP Committee, parental
permission for medical intervention can substitute for the child's consent
only in situations of clear and immediate medical necessity, such as
131
The AAP Committee directs that for
disease, trauma or deformity.
non-essential treatments, particularly those that can be deferred without
loss of efficacy, the physician and family wait until the child's consent can
132
be obtained. The medical profession in the United Kingdom adheres to
similar rules. The United Kingdom Department of Health's guidelines
state that
[t)hose acting for the child can only legally give their consent
provided that the intervention is for the benefit of the child. If
they are responsible for allowing the child to be subjected to any
risk (other than one so insignificant as to be negligible) that is
not outweighed by the prospect of medical benefit to the child,
133
they act illegally .
To assist parents in making decisions that comport with their child's best
interests, medical professionals must satisfy the same requirements of
informed consent/parental permission that apply to decision-making by
competent adults and by surrogates for incompetent adults. First, the
physician must disclose to parents all relevant information that a
competent patient would want to know if the procedure were to be
performed on him. Second, the physician must ensure that parents have
the capacity to understand and think rationally about the information
given to them. Third, the physician must ensure that the parents' decision
is voluntary and not manipulated in any way by the manner in which the
information is presented or the time at which parents' permission is
sought. With respect to interventions that are not medically indicated, it

130. See Dwyer, supra note 84, at 1406-23.
131. Committee on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and
Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314,314-16 (1995).
132. ld.
133. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES,
Department of Health, Local Research Ethics Committees,§ 4.4, London (1991).
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is improper at any time for a physician to suggest the procedure to parents
who have not inquired about it; such a suggestion would amount to
solicitation and would likely be interpreted by parents as a medical
recommendation. Just as it would be unethical for a physician to
recommend a non-medically indicated intervention to the surrogate of an
incompetent adult, it is also unethical to recommend such an intervention
to the surrogate of a child.

IV. CIRCUMCISION: A SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE CONSENT
DOCTRINE

The foregoing discussion of medical consent in general and in the
special case of parental permission for procedures on children yields a
framework for analyzing circumcision. For simplicity, the analysis below
is limited to the standard case of neonatal circumcision on newborn boys
with normal genitalia. In 1999, history was made when a United Kingdom
family court addressed on the merits a proposed circumcision of a fiveyear-old boy for religious reasons and unambiguously concluded that an
order for circumcision would not be granted as circumcision did not
satisfy the "paramountcy of welfare" standard, i.e., it was not in the best
134
interests of the child. Due in part to the pervasive presence of neonatal
circumcision in American society, no case addressing the validity of
parental permission for a routine circumcision has ever been decided in a
United States court. Instead, courts have repeatedly demonstrated their
determination to avoid any confrontation with the legal issues raised by
neonatal circumcision. In 1987, a lawsuit challenging the legal validity of
parental permission for neonatal circumcision was denied by a California
135
trial court and subsequently affirmed by the state appeals court.
The
136
California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.
More

134. See Re J (Child's Religious Upbringing and Circumcision), [1999] 2
F.L.R. 678 (Fam. Div.), affirmed, [2000] 1 F.L.R. 571 (C.A.). The Family Division
decision is also available at http://www.butterworths.co.uk/academic/
fortin/cases/Re_J.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2000).
135. London v. Glassner, California Court of Appeal, 1st District, No.
A032040 (unpublished, petition for review denied); see also R. Morris, The First
Circumcision Case, THE TRUTH SEEKER 47 (July/August, 1989).
136. London v. Glassner, supra note 135. Adam London brought the case via
his mother, who acted as guardian ad litem. The consent form signed by the
mother stated that neonatal circumcision had no medical purpose. The issue
before the court was whether a parent could grant permission for a surgical
procedure that had no medical purpose.
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recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's
invocation of lack of standing as a justification for refusing to consider a
mother's claim on behalf of her son who was circumcised with his father's
137
consent, but without her consent.
Currently, an ongoing contest in New Jersey is attracting national
interest which - like Re J - involves two divorcing parents with opposite
desires regarding circumcision of their male child, three-year-old Matthew
Price. The Price case, in which unlike the British case neither parent
claims any religious motives for their desires regarding the circumcision of
their son, may in the end become the first recorded American case
directly addressing the viability of parental consent to circumcision.
Already, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ordered the .trial court to
hold a rehearing in the matter, and has appointed an experienced
138
children's rights attorney as guardian ad litem.
Despite well-settled precedent supporting the viability of such a claim,
which though technically moot is "capable of repetition, yet evading
139
review," the court ruled, based on the fact that the plaintiff had already
had a circumcision performed, that no remedy existed for the plaintiff and
the court could not protect him from being circumcised.
Because there is no possibility of obtaining consent from the patient,
the issues then become whether parents can give effective permission for
the procedure, and what legal and ethical obligations doctors may have in
this situation. Doctors do have a strict obligation to ensure that parents
receive all material information relating to the risks and benefits of
circumcision in a manner that they can comprehend, that any parent
giving permission is fully competent to evaluate the information provided
and the treatment's potential consequences, and that parents are not in
any way unduly influenced by the manner or timing of the disclosure.
The requirements for surrogates are in some respects more stringent
than those affecting a patient's own consent.
While in certain
circumstances patients may themselves be able to provide legally valid
consent to prophylactic removal of their own healthy tissue, parents can
137. See Fishbeck v. North Dakota, 115 F.3d 580, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1997). The
plaintiffs attempted to challenge a North Dakota law (N.D. Cent. Code§ 12.1-3601 (1997)) prohibiting female genital mutilation on the grounds that the law was
unconstitutional for lack of equal protection of males.
138. C. Shoemaker, Baby M. Lawyer Joins Case on Circumcision,
[Bridgewater, New Jersey] Courier News, Nov. 4, 2000, at Dl.
139. SeeS. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498,
515 (1911); see also, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
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never grant permission for prophylactic removal of healthy tissue from
their children. The benefits of the proposed procedure must clearly
outweigh short - and long-term disadvantages, and spiritual costs and
benefits may not be incorporated into this analysis. The decision must be
made solely for the patient's own benefit; even potentially life-saving
assistance for a close family member cannot justify violating a nonconsenting patient's right to be free of intrusive medical procedures.
Parents should thus be able to give effective permission for
circumcision, and doctors should be permitted to perform a circumcision,
only if the procedure is medically necessary, providing urgently needed
medical benefits clearly outweigh any attendant costs. As we shall see,
the evidence does not support routine circumcision.

A.

Does routine circumcision provide urgently needed medical
benefits?

Circumcision does not correct an existing injury, disease or harmful
malfunction. Thus, even if circumcision provides some medical benefit,
there is no urgency to perform the procedure. General ethical and legal
principles concerning surgery on children therefore dictate that the
decision whether a male will be circumcised must be suspended until the
male is capable of making the decision himself. This is even clearer if
claimed medical benefits would not be realized until adulthood.
At most, some contend that circumcision is a prophylactic measure, to
prevent urinary tract infection (UTI) in boys, penile cancer and sexually
140
transmitted diseases (STDs) in adult males. Thus, the only claimed
benefit that males would realize before adulthood is a reduced rate of
UTI. It cannot plausibly be maintained that this is an urgently needed
medical benefit. Moreover, even if urgency were not required, and even if
the claimed prophylactic benefit were significant, that benefit would, at a
minimum, have to clearly outweigh any harm that circumcision might
cause in order to overcome the general, well-established presumption
against incursion on a non-consenting person's physical integrity.
In addition, as explained below, the claims that circumcision has
prophylactic value have been essentially refuted. These claims are the
latest in a long history of claimed benefits from circumcision that have
proven to be illusory. In 1896, for example, the medical profession
contended that circumcision helps avoid "phimosis, paraphimosis,
140. Edgar J. Schoen, Wiswell TE, Moses S., New Policy on CircumcisionCause for Concern, 105 PEDIATRICS 620, 620-23 (2000).
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redundancy (where the prepuce more than covers the glans), adhesions,
papillomata, eczema (acute and chronic), oedema, chancre, chancroid,
cicatrices, inflammatory thickening, elephantiasis, naevus, epithelioma,
gangrene, tuberculosis, preputial calculi, hip-joint disease, hernia, ...
[o]nanism, seminal emissions, enuresis, dysuria, retention, general
141
nervousness, impotence, convulsions, hystero-epilepsy."
All of these
claims were ultimately shown to lack scientific foundation. More recent
142
justifications likewise have been shown to lack scientific merit.
The
evidence regarding the current claims is evaluated below.

1.
Phimosis, balanitis, and hygiene concerns do not justify
routine circumcision
143

Although commonly given as justifications for neonatal circumcision,
there is no scientific evidence to support these claims. The incidence of
144
phimosis following circumcision (0.3% to 1.0% ) is approximately the
145
same as for males never circumcised (0.6% to 0.9%).
In comparative
studies the incidence of phimosis and balanitis was not significantly
146
different between those circumcised and those not circumcised.
While it has likewise been asserted that a circumcised penis is more
hygienic, no studies in the medical literature exist to support such a claim.
To the contrary, circumcised boys under the age of three years have been
found to have more problems associated with poor hygiene than intact

141. See Editor, Circumscisus, 49 MED. REC. 430,430 (1896).
142. See FREDERICK HODGES, A Short History of the Institutionalization of
Involuntary Sexual Mutilation in the United States, in SEXUAL MUTILATIONS: A
HUMAN TRAGEDY 17-40 (G.C. Denniston & M.F. Milos eds. 1997).
143. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Report of the Task Force on
Circumcision, 84 PEDIATRICS 388,388,390 (1989).
144. See Yosef A . Kaweblum et al., Circumcision Using the Mogen Clamp, 23
CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 679, 681-82 (1984); see also R.S. Van Howe, Variability in
Penile Appearance and Penile Findings: A Prospective Study, 80 BRIT. J .
UROLOGY 776 (1997).
145. See K.R. Shankar & A.M.K. Rickwood, The Incidence of Phimosis in
Boys, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 101, 101 (1999); see also A.M.K. Rickwood et al.,
Phimosis in Boys, 52 BRIT. J. UROLOGY 147 (1980).
146. See D.M. Fergusson et al., Neonatal Circumcision and Penile Problems:
An 8-year Longitudinal Study, 81 PEDIATRICS 537,537-39 (1988); see also Lynn W.
Herzog & Susana R. Alvarez, The Frequency of Foreskin Problems in
Uncircumcised Children, 140 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 254, 254-55 {1986); Van
Howe, supra note 144, at 777-78.
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147

Urinary tract infections do not justify routine circumcision

Of the claimed benefits of circumcision, only one - reduction of UTI would occur during childhood, before a male is able to decide for himself
whether to undergo the procedure. Some studies have suggested a weak
148
association between having a foreskin and developing a UTI a large
proportion of UTis are the result of anatomical defects of the urinary
149
tract and kidney.
The connection, however, is extremely tenuous; one
study calculates that roughly 195 boys would require circumcision to
150
prevent one UTI occurrence.
Even a study by a leading circumcision
advocate estimated that circumcision prevents UTI in less than one
151
percent of boys who undergo the procedure. Unfortunately, no one has
yet made a viable attempt at producing data demonstrably free of
influence from the numerous potential confounding variables. Until a
153
152
study takes into account the influence of rooming in, breast feeding,
147. See Van Howe, supra note 144, at 778.
148. Teresa To et a!., Cohort Study on Circumcision of Newborn Boys and
Subsequent Risk of Urinary-Tract Infection, 352 LANCET 1813, 1813, 1815 (1998);
J.C. Craig, J.F. Knight, P. Sureshkumar, E. Mantz, L.P. Roy, Effect of
Circumcision on Incidence of Urinary Tract Infection in Preschool Boys, 128 J.
PEDIATRICS 23, 23-27 (1996); Ellen F. Crain, J.C. Gershel, Urinary Tract Infections
in Febrile Infants Younger than 8 weeks of age, 86 PEDIATRICS 363, 363-67 (1990).
149. Jan Winberg eta!., Epidemiology of Symptomatic Urinary Tract Infection
in Childhood, 252 ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA SUPPL. 1, 8 (1974); T.
Bergstrom, Sex Differences in Childhood Urinary Tract Infection, 47 ARCHIVES OF
DISEASE IN CHILDREN 227 (1972); S.R. Saxena, D.C. Bassett, Sex-related Incidence
in Proteus Infection of the Urinary Tract in Childhood, 50 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE
IN CHILDREN 899 (1975); R.J. Hallett et a!., Urinary Infection in Boys: A Threeyear Prospective Study, 2 LANCET 1107 (1976); Linda Pead & Rosalind Maskell,
Study of Urinary Tract Infection in Children in One Health Disctrict, 309 BRITISH
MEDICAL JOURNAL 631, 632 (1994); T. Bergstrom et a!., Symptomatic Urinary
Tract Infection in Boys in the First Year of Life with Special Reference to Scar
Formation, 1 INFECTION 192 (1973).
150. See To eta!., supra note 148, at 1813, 1815 (1998).
151. See Thomas E. Wiswell et a!., Declining Frequency of Circumcision:
Implications for Changes in the Absolute Incidence and Male to Female Sex Ratio
of Urinary Tract Infections in Early Infancy, 79 PEDIATRICS 338, 341 (1987).
152. See Jan Winberg et a!., The Prepuce: A Mistake of Nature?, 1 LANCET
598, 599 (1989).
153. Alfredo Pisacane et a!., Breastfeeding and Urinary Tract Infection, 336
LANCET 50, 50 (1990); Alfredo Pisacane et a!., Breast-Feeding and Urinary Tract
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•

154

155

•

156

level of parental education, prenatal maternal UTI, premature btrth,
157
58
history of UTI in a first degree relative, hygienic practices/ previous
160
161
159
bacterial or viral infection, previous course of antibiotics, race, urine
53
162
collection method and diagnostic criteria/ no definitive conclusions are

Infection, 120 J. PEDIATRICS 87, 87, 89 (1992); Giovanni V. Coppa et al.,
Preliminary Study of Breastfeeding and Bacterial Adhesion to Uroepthelial Cells,
335 LANCET 569, 570 (1990); Staffan MArild et al., Breastfeeding and Urinary- Tract
Infection 336 LANCET 942, 942 (1990); Staffan MArild et al., Medical Histories of
Children with Acute Pyelonephritis Compared with Controls, 8 PEDIATRIC
INFECfiOUS DISEASE J. 511, 515 (1989).
154. See D.C.L. Savage et al., Covert Bacteriuria of Childhood. A Clinical and
Epidemiological Study, 48 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 8, 14 (1973).
155. See generally Marguerite J. Patrick, Influence of Maternal Renal Infection
on the Fetus and Infant, 42 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 208 (1967).
156. See generally Mustapha Maherzi et al., Urinary Tract Infection in HighRisk Newborn Infants, 62 PEDIATRICS 521 (1978); Abdulkareem I. Airede,
Urinary-Tract Infections in African Neonates, 25 J. INFECfiON 55 (1992); A.
Eliakim et al., Urinary Tract Infection in Premature Infants: the Role of Imaging
Studies and Prophylactic Therapy, 17 J. PERINATOLOGY 305 (1997); Chester M.
Edelmann Jr. et al., The Prevalence of Bacteriuria in Full-Term and Premature
Newborn Infants, 82 J. PEDIATRICS 125 (1973).
157. See MArild, Medical Histories, supra note 153, at 511-15.
158. See Peter Malleson, Prepuce Care, 77 PEDIATRICS 265, 265 (1986); see
also Kenneth L. Harkavy, The Circumcision Debate, 79 PEDIATRICS 649, 649
(1987); Stan J. Watson, Care of the Uncircumcised Penis, 80 PEDIATRICS 765, 765
(1987); Nicholas Cunningham, Circumcision and Urinary Tract Infections, 77
PEDIATRICS 267,267 (1986).
159. See Marild, Medical Histories, supra note 153, at 511-15.
160. See id.
161. See Asghar Askari & A.Barry Belman, Vesicoureteral Reflux in Black
Girls, 127 J. UROLOGY 747 (1982); see also Steven J. Skoog & A. Barry Belman,
Primary Vesicoureteral Reflux in the Black Child, 87 PEDIATRICS 538 (1991);
Kathy N. Shaw et et a!., Prevalence of Urinary Tract Infection in Febrile Young
Children in the Emergency Department (Abstract E16], 102 no.2 PEDIATRICS 390
(1998), also available at http://www. pediatrics.org/cgi/con tent/full/102/2/e16 (last
visited Nov. 12, 2000); Calvin M. Kunin, The Natural History of Recurrent
Bacteriuria in Schoolgirls, 282 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1443, 1444 (1970); Calvin M .
Kunin, Epidemiology and Natural History of Urinary Tract Infection in School
Age Children, 18 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 509 (1971).
162. See generally Theresa A. Schlager et a!., Explanation for False Positive
Urine Cultures Obtained by Bag Technique, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MED. 170 (1995); P.M. Fleiss, Explanation for False Positive Urine
Cultures Obtained by Bag Technique, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT
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possible regarding the protective effects of neonatal circumcision. This
list of other possible variables suggests that even if circumcision did have
an effect on UTI, a comparable or greater prophylactic effect could be
accomplished by less drastic and less intrusive means - for example, by
simply teaching parents and children proper hygiene and by encouraging
mothers to breastfeed.
Moreover, most UTis are minor and are easily treated with oral
antibiotics. The foreskin has not been linked to the more serious

MED. 1041 (1995); W.L. Robson & A.K. Leung, Explanation for False Positive
Urine Cultures Obtained by Bag Technique, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MED. 1042 (1995); Jacob Amir et al., The Reliability of Midstream
Urine Culture from Circumcised Male Infants, 147 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 969
(1993); Theresa A. Schlager et al., Bacterial Contamination Rate of Urine Collected
in a Urine Bag from Healthy Non-Toilet-Trained Male Infants, 116 J. PEDIATRICS
738 (1990); Xavier Saez-Liorens et al., Bacterial Contamination Rates for NonClean-Catch and Clean-Catch Midstream Urine Collections in Uncircumcised Boys,
114 J. PEDIATRICS 93 (1989); Jacob A. Lohr et al., Bacterial Contamination Rates
for Non-Clean-Catch and Clean-Catch Midstream Urine Collections in Boys, 109 J.
PEDIATRICS 659 (1986); W.A. Bonadio, Urine Culturing Technique in Febrile
Children, 3 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY CARE 75 (1987); J.D. Nelson & P.C. Peters,
Suprapubic Aspiration of Urine in Premature and Term Infants, 36 PEDIATRICS
132 (1965); G.D. Abbott, Neonatal Bacteriuria- The Value of Bladder Puncture in
Resolving Problems of Interpretation Arising from Voided Urine Specimens, 14
AUSTL. PEDIATRIC J. 83 (1978); John M. McCarthy & Charles V. Pryles, Clean
Voided and Catheter Neonatal Urine Specimens. Bacteriology in the Male and
Female Neonate, 106 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 473 (1963); John J. Boehm & James
L. Haynes, Bacteriology of 'Midstream Catch' Urines: Studies in Newborn Infants,
111 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 366 (1966); C.G.H. Newman et al., Pyuria in Infancy,
and the Role of Suprapubic Aspiration of Urine in the Diagnosis of Infections of
the Urinary Tract, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 277 (1967); Ofelia T. Monzon et al., A
Comparison of Bacterial Counts of the Urine Obtained by Needle Aspiration of the
Bladder, Catheterization and Midstream-Voided Methods, 259 NEW ENG. J. MED.
764 (1958); Paul Valenstein & Frederick Meier, Urine Culture Contamination: A
College of Am. Pathologists Q-probes Study of Contaminated Urine Cultures in
906 Institutions, 122 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 123 (1998); J.
Pylkkanen et al., Diagnostic Value of Symptoms and Clean-Voided Urine
Specimens in Childhood Urinary Tract Infection, 68 ACTA PAEDIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 341 (1979).
163. See Alejandro Hoberman & Ellen R. Wald, Urinary Tract Infections in
Young Febrile Children, 16 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 11 (1997); see also
S. Hansson et al., Low Bacterial Counts in Infants with Urinary Tract Infection, 132
J. PEDIATRICS 180 (1998).
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164

infections that reach the kidneys.
The most common infection-related
claim by defenders of circumcision is that males not circumcised will
166
165
develop renal failure. However, that claim is unsupportable. There is
no reliable data on the rate of renal failure in children in the United
167
168
States. Two Swedish studies have yielded more reliable information.
The first study showed that UTI was not responsible for any of the renal
169
failures among children in Sweden. The second study showed that UTI
170
was responsible for only five percent of renal failures among children.
Using the highest recorded Swedish national rate of renal failure in

164. See Elizabeth R. Mueller et al., The Incidence of Genitourinary
Abnormalities in Circumcised and Uncircumcised Boys Presenting with an Initial
Urinary Tract Infection by 6 Months of Age [Abstract 121], 100 PEDIATRICS 580,
580 (1997).
165. James A. Roberts, Neonatal Circumcision: An End to the Controversy?
89 SOUTHERN MED. J. 167 (1996); James A. Roberts, Is Routine Circumcision
Indicated in the Newborn? An Affirmative View, 31 J. FAM. PRAC. 185, 186-88
(1990); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision Circumspection, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1244, 1244-45 (1997); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision-An Update, 22 CuRRENT
PROBLEMS IN PEDIATRICS 424, 424-25 (1992); Thomas E. Wiswell, Routine
Neonatal Circumcision: A Reappraisal, 41 AMERICAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN 859, 860
(1990); Thomas E. Wiswell, Do You Favor . .. Routine Neonatal Circumcision?
Yes, 84 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 98, 98 (1988); Edgar J. Schoen, The Status of
Circumcision of Newborns, 322 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1308, 1309 (1990); Edgar J.
Schoen, Benefits of Newborn Circumcision: Is Europe Ignoring Medical Evidence?
77 ARCHIVES OF DISEASES IN CHILDHOOD 258 (1997); Edgar J. Schoen et al., New
Policy on Circumcision- Cause for Concern, 105 PEDIATRICS 620 (2000).
166. See Roberts, supra note 165, at 168-70 (1996); Schoen, supra note 165, at
258; Thomas E. Wiswell, Do You Favor ... Routine Neonatal Circumcision? Yes,
84 POSTGRADUATE MED. 98, 98-99 (1988); Thomas E. Wiswell & Dietrich W.
Geschke, Risks from Circumcision during the First Month of Life Compared with
Those for Uncircumcised Boys, 83 PEDIATRICS 1011, 1011, 1013 (1989); Thomas E.
Wiswell, Routine Neonatal Circumcision: A Reappraisal, 41 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN
859, 859-60 (1990); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision Circumspection, 336 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1244, 1244-45 (1997); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision Questions
[Letters to the Editor- Reply], 93 PEDIATRICS 1021, 1022 (1994).
167. Many of the European countries, through the records kept as part of
their national health insurance, keep national registries of disease incidence. No
such registries are maintained in the United States.
168. See generally Ingemar Helin & Jan Winberg, Chronic Renal Failure in
Swedish Children, 69 ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 607 (1980); E.
Esbjorner et al., Children with Chronic Renal Failure in Sweden 1978-1985, 4
PEDIATRIC NEPHROLOGY 249 (1990).
169. See Helin, supra note 168, at 610.
170. See Esbjorner, supra note 168, at 249.
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children and assuming that all cases of renal failure from UTI in boys
could be prevented by neonatal circumcision, it would take 476,190
circumcisions to prevent one instance of renal failure. Those 476,190
circumcisions would, as a statistical matter, cause at least 952 life171
threatening complications. Circumcising to prevent renal failure is thus
clearly irrational.
In short, if circumcision does reduce UTI, it is a woefully ineffective
method, especially when weighed against the very significant
complications and other disadvantages which are discussed below in
further detail. Contrary to the retrospective data gathered elsewhere, a
prospective study of 603 Japanese boys, none of whom were circumcised,
172
found that none had ever had a UTI. This result casts doubt upon the
American studies from which one would have predicted that between six
and twenty-four of these boys (1-4%) would have had a UTI. The
Japanese study suggests that either Japanese hygiene is vastly superior or
that the American studies are flawed.
3.

Penile cancer does not justify routine circumcision

Accurate data on the rates of penile cancer in circumcised and intact
men in the United States is not available. There have been no
epidemiologic studies of the rate of penile cancer in circumcised males,
nor has there been any studies that distinguished on the basis of
circumcision status. Claims that routine circumcision has lowered penile
173
cancer rates are therefore difficult to support. Countries such as Japan,
174
175
176
•
.
. . IS
. rare, h ave
wh"1ch cucumcts1on
N orway, p·m1and an d D enmark , m

171. See William F. Gee & Julian S. Ansell, Neonatal Circumcision: A Tenyear Overview: With Comparison of the Gomco Clamp and the Plastibell Device,
58 PEDIATRICS 824; 827 (1976).
172. See Hiroyuki Kayaba et a!., Analysis of Shape and Retractibility of the
Prepuce in 603 Japanese Boys, 156 J. UROLOGY 1813 (1996).
173. See C.S. Muir & Janine Nectoux, Epidemiology of Cancer of the Testis
and Penis, National Cancer Institute Monograph 53: Second Symposium on
Epidemiology and Cancer Registries in the Pacific Basin 157-64 (1979).
174. See T. Iverson et al., Squamous Cell Carcinoma of the Penis and of the
Cervix, Vulva and Vagina in Spouses: Is There Any Relationship? An
Epidemiological Study from Norway, 1960-92, 76 BRIT. J. CANCER 658, 658 (1997).
175. See A.G. Maiche, Epidemiological Aspects of Cancer of the Penis in
Finland, 1 EuR. J. CANCER PREVENTION 153 (1992).
176. See M. Frisch et al., Falling Incidence of Penis Cancer in an
Uncircumcised Population (Denmark I943-90), 311 BRIT. MED. J. 1471 (1995).
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penile cancer rates that are lower than the estimated rates in the United
177
States. In any event, the rate of penile cancer in all western countries is
extremely low; among all males in Japan, Finland, Norway, and Denmark,
countries that employ national cancer registries, for example, the rate
ranges from 0.5 to 0.8 per 100,000. In the United States, where the cancer
incidences are based on estimates, the incidence of penile cancer is
approximately 0.8 per 100,000 and accounts for only 0.16% of all cancers
178
in American males.
By way of comparison, the combined rate of ovarian and breast cancer
in women is 264 times higher than the rate of penile cancer in men, and
. much more common m
. men than pem'1 e cancer. 179 A s
breast cancer ts
noted above, clear, incontrovertible evidence demonstrates that
prophylactic removal of breast and/or ovarian tissue would reduce the
likelihood of developing cancer enough to add months to the life
expectancy of average patients and several years to the life expectancy of
180
women with genetic markers for breast cancer.
Yet, as also noted
above, the substantial potential benefit of an oophorectomy and/or
mastectomy is universally regarded as inadequate to justify such
prophylactic surgery, except in a woman at high-risk for ovarian or breast
181
cancer. It would be unthinkable to perform the surgery on a young girl.
If a female were ever to undergo such prophylactic surgery it could not
occur until after she both reached adulthood and gave informed consent
to the procedure. Even if it were correct that circumcision reduces the
risk of penile cancer to a statistically significant degree, it would still be
clearly unjustified to use circumcision as a prophylactic. Even if the
highest estimates of reduced risk were accurate, it would take over
260,000 circumcisions to prevent a single case of penile cancer. It follows
that in 260,000 circumcisions, one would expect 520 life-threatening
182
complications. Routinely amputating healthy tissue in quest of such
remote and speculative benefits is irrational and violates both medical
. an d h uman ng
. h ts. 183
et h tcs
177. See P.A. Wingo et al., Cancer Statistics, 1995, 45 CAL. CANCER J. FOR
8-30 (1995).
178. See id.
179. See S.L. Parker et al., Cancer Statistics, 1997, 47 CAL. CANCER J. FOR
CLINICIANS 5-27 (1997).
180. See further discussion supra Part II. C.
181. See further discussion supra Part II.C.
182. See Gee, supra note 171, at 824-27.
183. See Svoboda, supra note 3, at 205-15 (routine infant male circumcision
CLINICIANS
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4.
Sexually transmitted disease prevention does not justify
routine circumcision
The role of circumcision in preventing STDs is even less clear. For
each sexually transmitted infection, including HIV, there are
184
contradictory medical studies.
Because the epidemiology of STDs
involves a mixture of biological, sociological and psychological factors, it
is impossible to isolate the foreskin as a factor in the spread of STDs. The
available medical literature suggests certain trends, but nothing definitive.
Circumcised men actually appear more likely to contract urethritis (such
as gonorrhea or chlamydia) or viral infections (such as herpes simplex or
human papillomavirus). Intact men, on the other hand, appear slightly
185
The role of
more prone to genital ulcers (such as chancroid).
186
circumcision in the transmission of HIV is far from decided.
Although several African studies have suggested that circumcision
reduces the risk of HIV infection, several others have failed to document
187
any significant influence.
A few population surveys have found
188
circumcision to increase the risk of HIV infection. Meta-analysis of the
published studies has revealed a significant degree of between-study
heterogeneity. The one trend noted is that a foreskin may place an
African man who engages in high-risk sexual behaviors at increased risk
189
For the general population, circumcision does not
for HIV infection.

violates numerous human rights under a variety of international treaties including
the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child); Denniston, supra note 61.
184. R.S. Van Howe, Does Circumcision Influence Sexually Transmitted
Diseases?: A Literature Review, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 52, 52-62 (1999).
185. See id.
186. See I. De Vincenzi & T. Mertens, Male Circumcision: A Role in HIV
Prevention?, 8 AIDS 153 (1994); R.S. Van Howe, Circumcision and HIV Infection:
Meta-analysis and Review of the Medical Literature, 10 INT'L J. STD & AIDS 8
(1999).
187. See Van Howe, supra note 186, at 8-16.
188. See id.
189. See Nigel O'Farrell & Matthias Egger, Circumcision in Men and the
Prevention of HIV Infection: A "Meta-Analysis" Revisited, 11 INT'L J. STD &
AIDS 137, 141 (2000); R. Hayes & H.A. Weiss, Meta-Analysis on the
Relationships between Male Circumcision and HW Infection (paper presented at
the Thirteenth Meeting of the International Society for Sexually Transmitted
Diseases Research, Denver, Colorado, July 13, 1999).
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190

appear to have an impact.
Even proponents of circumc1s1on
acknowledge that the African experience with HIV does not apply to first
191
world countries. The most effective timing of circumcision is also under
dispute. One African study documented that males circumcised before
fifteen years of age were at greater risk of contracting HIV, 192 while those
193
Because
circumcised after twelve years of age were at a lower risk.
genital discharge is more prevalent than genital ulcers, the one consistent
trend, from several recent population surveys, is that circumcised men are
194
at greater risk for contracting a STD.
It is therefore inappropriate to
cite avoidance of STDs as a justification for circumcision.

B.
1.

Harm caused by male circumcision

Complications

On the cost side, retrospective studies show that rates of immediate
complications associated with neonatal circumcision are somewhere
195
196
between 2.0% and 6.8%.
One prospective study, looking only for
evidence of hemorrhage, found the rate of hemorrhage following neonatal
197
These estimates all exceed the 1.0% to 1.7%
circumcision was 9.9%.

190. See O'Farrell & Egger, supra note 189, at 141; Hayes & Weiss, supra
note 189.
191. See Stephen Moses et al., Analysis of the Scientific Literature on Male
Circumcision and Risk for HIV Infection, 10 INT'L J. STD & AIDS 626 (1999).
192. See Maria Quigley et al., Sexual Behaviour Patterns and Other Risk
Factors for HIV Infection in Rural Tanzania: A Case-Control Study, 11 AIDS 237
(1997).
193. See Robert Kelly et al., Age of Male Circumcision and Risk of Prevalent
HIV Infection in Rural Uganda, 13 AIDS 399, 399 (1999).
194. See Jeff Seed et al., Male Circumcision, Sexually Transmitted Disease,
and Risk of HJV, 8 J. OF ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME & HUMAN
RETROVIROLOGY 83 (1995); see also Edward 0 . Laumann et al., Circumcision in
the United States: Prevalence, Prophylactic Effects, and Sexual Practice, 277 JAMA
1052 (1997); Mark Urassa et al., Male Circumcision and Susceptibility to HIV
Infection among Men in Tanzania, 11 AIDS 73 (1997); Van'Howe, supra note 144,
at 52-62.
195. See Gee, supra note 171, at 827.
196. See Carlos A. Moreno & Janet P. Realini, Infant Circumcision in an
Outpatient Setting, 85 TEX. MED. 37,37 (1989).
197. See James M. Sutherland et al., Hemorrhagic Disease of the Newborn:
Breast Feeding as a Necessary Factor in the Pathogenesis, 113 AM. J. DISEASES IN
CHILD. 524 (1967).
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rate of complications for circumcisions performed after the first month of
198
life. Complications range from hemorrhage-sometimes to the point of
199
200
death and frequently necessitating a transfusion; minor infections; life202
203
201
threatening infections such as sepsis,
meningitis,
gangrene,
198. See Thomas E. Wiswell et al., Circumcision in Children Beyond the
Neonatal Period, 92 PEDIATRICS 791, 791 (1993); see also S. Walfisch et al.,
Circumcision of New Immigrants, 126 HAREFUAH 119 (1994); Venkata R. Jayanthi
et a!., Postneonatal Circumcision with Local Anesthesia: A Cost-Effective
Alternative, 161 J. UROLOGY 1301, 1301 (1999).
199. See Abdall S. Awidi, Delivery of Infants with Glanzmann
Thrombasthenia and Subsequent Blood Transfusion Requirements: A Follow-up of
39 Patients, 40 AM. J. HEMATOLOGY 1, 1 (1992); see generally G. Steinau et a!.,
Tageschirurgische (TCH) Eingriffe Im Kindesalter an Einer Chirurgischen Klinik,
118 ZENTRALBLATT FOR CHIRURGIE 25 (1993); R.W. Watts and P.A. Stokes,
Secondary Arterial Haemorrhage following Circumcision; An Unusual Cause of
Antepartum Haemorrhage, 26 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 312
(1986); John Denton et al., Circumcision Complication: Reaction to Treatment of
Local Hemorrhage with Topical Epinephrine in High Concentration, 17 CLINICAL
PEDIATRICS 285, 285 (1978); J.S. Poll & J.E. Prinsen, Niet-geplande opname na
dagverpleging bij kinderen, 134 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR GENEESKUNDE
1089 (1990); Wolfgang Cyran, Aus der Praxis einer Gutachterstelle: Schwere
Nachblutung nach einer Phimosenoperation, 88 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ARZTLICHE
FORTBILDUNG 703 (1994); Gee, supra note 171, at 824-27; T.M. Tsang & P.K.
Tam, Complications of Circumcision, 81 BRIT. J. SURGERY 473, 473 (1994);
Willson, Cesarean Section for Threatened Eclampsia and Death of the Child
following Circumcision, 68 AM. J. OBSTETRICS 351 (1913).
200. See J. Stranko et a!., Impetigo in Newborn Infants Associated with a
Plastic Bell Clamp Circumcision, 5 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE 597, 597-98
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1187 (1978).
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Circumcisions, 19 UROLOGY 453 (1982); C.K. Pearlman, Reconstruction following
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2.

Pain

An additional and generally under-appreciated cost is trauma to the
newborn. Research has determined that newborns experience more pain
230
from a given noxious stimuli than do older children and adults.
The

227. See generally C.D. Berry Jr. & R.R. Cross Jr., Urethral Meatal Caliber in
Circumcised and Uncircumcised Males, 92 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 621 (1956); A.
Steg & G. Allouch, Stenose du Meat et Circoncision, 85 J. UROLOGY &
NEPHROLOGY 727 (1979); J.D. Frank et a!., Urethral Strictures in Childhood, 62
BRIT. J. UROLOGY 590 (1988); C. Viville & J. Weltzer, Les Retrecissements
Iatrogenes De Lurethre (R.I.U.) Masculin. A Propos De 50. Observations, 87 J.
UROLOGY 413 (1981); John Graves, Pinpoint Meatus: Iatrogenic? 41 PEDIATRICS
1013 (1968); Meyer, supra note 176; D.M. Griffiths et al., A Prospective Survey of
the Indications and Morbidity of Circumcision in Children, 11 EuR. UROLOGY 184
(1985); M.C. Daley, Circumcision, 214 JAMA 2195 (1970); Douglas Gairdner, The
Fate of the Foreskin: a Study of Circumcision, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1433-37 (1949);
Patel, supra note 225, at 576; Alexandra Stenram et a!., Circumcision for Phimosis:
A Follow-up Study, 20 SCANDINAVIAN J. UROLOGY & NEPHROLOGY 89-92 (1986);
A. Stenram et a!., Circumcision for Phimosis-Indications and Results, 75 ACTA
PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 321 (1986); R. Persad et al., Clinical Presentation
and Pathophysiology of Meatal Stenosis following Circumcision, 75 BRIT. J.
UROLOGY 91 (1995); A. Ralph Thompson, Stricture of the External Urinary
Meatus, 1 LANCET 1373-77 (1935); J. Brennemann, The Ulcerated Meatus in· the
Circumcised Child, 21 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 38-47 (1921); Paul Freud, The
Ulcerated Urethral Meatus in Male Children, 31 J. PEDIATRICS 131-42 (1947);
W.M. Mastin, Infantile Circumcision a Cause of Contraction of the External
Urethral Meatus, 4 ANNALS ANATOMY & SURGERY 123 (1881); Van Howe, supra
note 144, at 776.
228. See generally A.G. Toguri et a!., Penile Tourniquet Syndrome Caused by
Hair, 72 S. MED. J. 627 (1979); F.S. Haddad, Penile Strangulation by Human Hair.
Report of Three Cases and Review of the Literature, 37 UROLOGY INT'L 375-88
(1982); Allan J. Pantuck et al., Hair Strangulation Injury of the Penis, 13
PEDIATRIC EMER. CARE 423 (1997); M. Aboulola et a!., Plaies de l'uretre par
cheveu etrangleur, 21 CHIRURGIE PEDIATRIQUE 283 (1980); A.Y. Bashir & M. £!Barbary, Hair Coil Strangulation of the Penis, 25 J. ROYAL COLL. SURGERY 47-51
(1980).
229. See generally Louis W. Sauer, Fatal Staphylococcus Bronchopneumonia
following Ritual Circumcision, 46 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 583 (1943);
Willson, supra note 199, at 351.
230. See K.J.S. Anand & P.R. Hickey, Pain and Its Effects in the Human
Neonate and Fetus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1321, 1321-29 (1987).
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231

procedure is extremely painful.
During circumcision, forceps or other
probes are inserted into the delicate foreskin, where they are used to
scrape, tear apart and destroy the normal erogenous tissues. The baby's
sensitive foreskin is crushed, and the raw flesh is cut with scissors.
Circumcision is usually followed by an alteration in sleep pattern marked
232
by prolonged non-rapid eye movement sleep. The procedure frequently
causes the newborn to withdraw from his environment thus interfering
233
with his process of bonding with the mother and nursing.
General
anesthesia is considered too risky for use in the neonatal period, so most
234
neonatal circumcisions are performed without anesthesia. Topical and
local anesthetics, which blunt some of the pain, do not adequately protect
the infant. Experimental evidence indicates that newborns experience
235
marked pain during circumcision, even when these agents are employed.
In 1997, researchers altered the number of subjects enrolled in an infant
circumcision pain study because they concluded that inflicting pain on

231. See P. Drake & L. French, Analgesia during Circumcision, 45 J. FAM.
PRAC. 100 (1997); Janice Lander eta!., Comparison of Ring Block, Dorsal Penile
Nerve Block, and Topical Anesthesia for Neonatal Circumcision: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 278 JAMA 2157-62 (1997).
232. See Robert N. Emde et a!., Stress and Neonatal Sleep, 33
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 491, 491-97 (1971).
233. See Richard E. Marshall et a!., Circumcision: II. Effects Upon MotherInfant Interaction, 7 EARLY HUMAN DEY. 367, 367-74 (1982).
234. See Tom Garry, Circumcision: a Survey of Fees and Practices, OBG
MANAGEMENT 34, 36 (Oct. 1994); see also Catherine Kelly et a!., Pediatric
Residency Training in the Normal Newborn Nursery: A National Survey, 151
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 511, 511-14 (1997).
235. See Robert S. Van Howe, Anesthesia for Neonatal Circumcision: Who
Benefits?, 12 J. PRENATAL & PERINATAL PSYCHOLOGY & HEALTH 3, 3-4, 6, 9-10,
13 (1997); see also RobertS. Van Howe, Anaesthesia for Circumcision: A Review
of the Literature, MALE AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC PRACTICE 67, 67, 80, 81-82, 88 (George
C. Denniston, Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F. Milos eds. 1999); Cynthia R.
Howard et a!., Acetaminophen Analgesia in Neonatal Circumcision: The Effect on
Pain, 93 PEDIATRICS 641, 641, 645 (1994); Howard J. Stang eta!., Local Anesthesia
for Neonatal Circumcision. Effects on Distress and Cortisol Response, 259 JAMA
1507, 1507, 1509-10, 1511 (1988); Teresa D. Puthoff eta!., Use of EMLA Prior to
Circumcision, 30 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1327, 1328, 1329 (1996); Anna
Taddio et a!., Efficacy and Safety of Lidocaine-prilocaine Cream for Pain during
Circumcision, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197, 1200-01 (1997); Paul S.
Williamson & Nolan D. Evans, Neonatal Cortisol Response to Circumcision with
Anesthesia, 25 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 412,412,414 (1986).
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236

unanesthetized control patients was unethical.
Circumcision causes trauma to infants who are born with relatively few
237
pain coping mechanisms. Pain causes irreversible changes in the infant's
238
developing brain, heightening his pain perception. These facts strongly
support at least delaying circumcision until a male is older, when more
can be done to avoid pain because the brain is more developed, thereby
reducing the likelihood of permanent damage from the trauma. A
prominent pediatric urologist has opined that postponing circumcision
until after toilet training may also decrease the high rate of meatal
239
stenosis in circumcised boys.

3.

Loss of Function

One recent study found that in circumcision approximately 50% of the
penile skin sheath is removed, along with thousands of specialized nerve
240
endings that are fundamental to normal sexual response.
The sheath
provides a natural lubricant and facilitates vaginal penetration during
241
sexual intercourse.
As a portion of the male reproductive apparatus,

236. See Lander, supra note 231, at 2157, 2159.
237. SeeM. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Pain, MRC News 20-23 (Summer 1998).
238. See Suzanne Dixon et al., Behavioral Effects of Circumcision with and
without Anesthesia, 51. DEY. & BEHAVIORAL PEDIATRICS 246,249 (1984); see also
Anna Taddio et al., Effect of Neonatal Circumcision on Pain Responses during
Vaccination in Boys, 345 LANCET 291, 292 (1995); Anna Taddio et al., Effect of
Neonatal Circumcision on Pain Response during Subsequent Routine Vaccination,
349 LANCET 599, 599, 602 (1997).
239. See J.D. Frank, Circumcision, Meatotomy and Meatoplasty, in PEDIATRIC
SURGERY 738, 745 (L. Spitz & A.G. Coran eds. 5th ed. 1995).
240. See Christopher J. Cold & Kenneth A. McGrath, Anatomy and Histology
of the Penile and Clitoral Prepuce in Primates: Evolutionary Perspective of
Specialised Sensory Tissue of the External Genitalia, in MALE AND FEMALE
CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC
PRACTICE 19, 19-20 (George C. Denniston, Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F.
Milos eds. 1999); see also Steve Scott, Anatomy and Physiology of the Human
Prepuce, in MALE AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC PRACTICE 9, 15, 16 (George C. Denniston,
Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F. Milos eds. 1999); J.R. Taylor et al., The
Prepuce: Specialized Mucosa of the Penis and Its Loss to Circumcision, 77 BRIT. J.
UROLOGY 291, 291 (1996).
241. See P.M. Fleiss, The Case Against Circumcision, MOTHERING <j[ 23 (Dec.
22, 1997).
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42

the foreskin is clearly not triviae

4.

Loss of Immunological Protection and Physical Protection

The human foreskin serves to protect the glans, an internal structure,
from injury. The prepuce also serves valuable immunological functions
243
The infant's prepuce
by providing several defenses against infection.
has a pronounced tight tip with a sphincter, formed from the whorl of
muscle tissue that stays closed to keep out foreign ·matter but opens to
244
permit the outflow of urine. The sub-preputial wetness contains several
245
The prepuce
secretions that act to destroy harmful microorganisms.
contains Langerhans cells, which provide the first line of mucosal
246
Our understanding of mucosal immunity is still in its
immunity.
.mf ancy. 247

C.

Medical Considerations Strongly Disfavor Routine Circumcision

Appropriate decision-making regarding the permissibility of infant
circumcision requires balancing a negligible reduction of overall UTI and
penile cancer rates against the significant disadvantages of the
procedure -loss of functional and highly erogenous tissue, loss of
immunological properties of the foreskin, risks of complications and the
excruciating pain the newborn experiences. This balancing surely would
yield the conclusion that the procedure is medically contra-indicated and
not in the best interests of the infant patient.
Numerous medical bodies around the world have recognized that

242. See Ronald S. Immerman·& Wade C. Mackey, A Biocultural Analysis of
Circumcision, 44 Soc. BIOLOGY 265,265-67,273 (1997).
243. See P.M. Fleiss et a!., Immunological Functions of the Human Prepuce,
74 SEXUALLY TRANSMIITED INFECTIONS 364, 364 (1998); see generally Gregory L.
Smith eta!., Circumcision as a Risk Factor for Urethritis·in Racial Groups, 77 AM.
J. PuB. HEALTH 452, 452, 454 (1987); Paul M.N. Werker eta!., The Prepuce Free
Flap: Dissection Feasibility Study and Clinical Application of a Super-Thin Flap,
102 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1075 (1998) .
244. See Geoffrey Jefferson, The Peripenis Muscle: Some Observations on the
Anatomy of Phimosis, 23 SURGICAL GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 177, 178
(August, 1916).
245. See generally John Money & Jackie Davison, Adult Penile Circumcision:
Its Erotosexual and Cosmetic Sequelae, 19 J. SEX RESEARCH 289 (1983).
246. See C.J. Cold and J.R. Taylor, The Prepuce, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 34,
40 (1999).
247. See Fleiss, supra note 243, at 364.
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routine infant circumcision is not medically justifiable. For example, in
1996, the Australian Association of Pediatric Surgeons announced that it
does not support routine infant circumcision, because it is "inappropriate
248
and unnecessary."
In 1997, the Australian Medical Association stated
that neonatal circumcision should be discouraged by the medical
249
profession.
In 1991, the Australian College of Pediatrics likewise
250
discouraged the practice of neonatal circumcision. The National Health
and Medical Research Council of Australia has stated that neonatal
circumcision has "no medical indication" and that "the hazards of the
251
operation ... outweigh any possible advantages."
The British Medical
Association has recommended that male circumcision be performed only
when medically necessary, stating that complications, including death,
252
may result from this generally unnecessary surgery.
In 1996, the
Canadian Pediatric Society recommended that "[c)ircumcision of
253
newborns should not be routinely performed."
Significantly, even
though circumcision is the most frequently performed urological
procedure on children in the United States, a recent review article in an
American journal discussing optimal times for performing various
254
urological procedures on children did not mention circumcision.
The AAP has issued a series of statements regarding circumcision.
Remarkably, even though the procedure is widespread in the United
States and performed by many of the organization's members, the AAP
has never endorsed routine infant circumcision. In 1975, the AAP Task
Force on Circumcision issued its first policy statement on circumcision,
248. See generally J. Fred Leditschke, Australian Association of Paediatric
Surgeons, Guidelines for Circumcision 1 (April1996).
249. See generally Australian Medical Association, Circumcision Deterred, 6
AUSTL. MED. 5 (1997).
250. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, Research Paper: Circumcision
of Male Infants (Brisbane, Australia: QLRC, 1993), available at
http://www.cirp.org/library/legal/QLRC (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
251. See NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Report of
the Ninety-Fifth Session 13 (June 1983).
252. See A Ritual Operation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1458, 1459 (1949); The Case
Against Neonatal Circumcision, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1163, 1163 (1979).
253. See Fetus and Newborn Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society,
Neonatal Circumcision Revisited, 154 CAN. MEn. Ass'N J. 769, 769 (1996).
254. See generally American Academy of Pediatrics, Section on Urology,
Timing of Elective Surgery on the Genitalia of Male Children with Particular
Reference to the Risks, Benefits, and Psychological Effects of Surgery and
Anesthesia, 97 PEDIATRICS 590 (1996).

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

114

[Vol. 17:61

concluding that "[t]here is no absolute medical indication for routine
255
circumcision of the newborn." In 1999, the AAP admitted that scientific
256
Apparently
evidence does not support routine neonatal circumcision.
unprepared, however, to accept the necessary conclusion that this
prevalent practice should stop, the AAP merely stressed the importance
of giving parents of male infants accurate and unbiased information and
257
In 1991, the
the opportunity to discuss the decision with a doctor.
American Academy of Family Physicians took no position other than to
258
state it was a parental decision.
Numerous medical bodies have stated
their opposition to neonatal circumcision, or have at least acknowledged
259
that the practice is not medically sound.
Not a single national or
international medical organization in the world recommends the
procedure.

D.

Can parental permission for circumcision ever be effective?

Given the foregoing, one might wonder how parental permission for
routine circumcision could ever be effective, even if physicians comply
with the requirements of informed permission.
Like all surgical
procedures, circumcision should not be subject to authorization by a
surrogate for an incompetent patient unless it is medically necessary.
While there is some dispute in the American medical community today as
to whether routine circumcision provides any medical benefit, absolutely
no one in the medical community seriously maintains that it is medically
260
necessary or that it corrects an existing injury, disease or malfunction.

255. See Hugh C. Thompson et al., Report of the Ad Hoc Task Force on
Circumcision, 56 PEDIATRICS 610,611 (1975).
256. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Task Force on Circumcision,
Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS 686, 691 (1999).
257. See id.
258. See American Academy of Family Physicians, Fact Sheet for Physicians
Regarding Neonatal Circumcision, 52 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 523,525 (1995).
259. See Am. Academy of Pediatrics Task Force on Circumcision, supra note
256, at 686; see also Am. Academy of Family Physicians, supra note 256, at 523;
Thompson, supra note 255, at 610; Fetus and Newborn Committee, supra note
253, at 769; J. Fred Leditschke, supra note 248; Australian Medical Association,
supra note 249, at 5; British Medical Association, supra note 252, at 1163.
260. To make the case that neonatal circumcision is necessary, one would
need to demonstrate that it is either indispensable, inevitable, mandatory,
unavoidable, or essential for good health. No one has attempted to make the case
that all males with foreskins are in poor health. In his pamphlet "Neonatal
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Accordingly, the Queensland Law Reform Commission in Australia
recently stated that "consent by parents to [neonatal circumcision] being
performed may be invalid in the light of the common law's restrictions on
the ability of parents to consent to the non-therapeutic treatment of
261
children. "
Both a best interests and a substituted judgment approach support this
conclusion. Recent cost-utility analyses for neonatal circumcision that
take as a given the supposed benefits with respect to not only UTis, but
also cancer and STDs, have concluded that over the course of a lifetime,
262
circumcision on the whole either impairs health or has virtually no
263
medical impact. The evidence presented by weighing the costs and
benefits suggests that circumcision is, in terms of the physical well-being
of a boy, not in his best interests and not something to which a rational
and fully informed person would be expected to consent. The inference
of what the infant male would choose for himself, if able, receives further
support from the actual choices of intact adult males. If the ultimate goal
of medical decision-making for an incompetent person is to determine
what the patient would decide for himself, if able, the best evidence may
be what similarly situated competent persons actually decide for
themselves. Of males in the United States that are not circumcised at
birth, only 3 in 1,000 choose to have the surgery performed later in life,

Circumcision IS Necessary" surgeon Gerald N. Weiss gives a string of arguments
lauding the advantages of neonatal circumcision, but never makes the case that
circumcision is either indispensable or essential for good health.
261. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, supra note 250; In re Jane, 85
A.L.R. 409, 435 (Austl. 1988) (discussing the relevance of its finding by
speculating that a contrary conclusion could lead to a wide range of wrongs
occurring including female circumcision: "The consequences of a finding that the
court's consent is unnecessary are far reaching both for parents and for children.
For example, such a principle might be used to justify parental consent to the
surgical removal of a girl's clitoris for religious or quasi cultural reasons, or the
sterilization of a perfectly healthy girl for misguided, albeit sincere, reasons. Other
possibilities might include parental consent to the donation of healthy organs such
as a kidney from one sibling to another.").
262. See Theodore G. Ganiats et a!., Routine Neonatal Circumcision: A CostUtility Analysis, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 282, 282-93 (1991); see also R.S. Van
Howe, Neonatal Circumcision: a Cost-utility Analysis [Abstract 98086], October
25-28, 1998 (poster presentation at the 20'h Annual Meeting of the Society for
Medical Decision-Making, Cambridge, MA.).
263. See Frank H. Lawler et al., Circumcision: A Decision Analysis of Its
Medical Value, 23 FAM. MED. 587,590 (1991).
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suggesting that the overwhelming majority believe that the risks and
264
sequelae of becoming circumcised outweigh any supposed benefits.
If
doctors followed the AAP Committee's recommendation to delay the
265
decision until the child is old enough to grant consent, circumcisions
would rarely be performed in this country, as is the case in most other
nations.
One author has noted that parents may authorize overtreatment of a
child, even though it provides no medical benefits to the child and may
actually cause harm, because it makes the parents feel better that they are
purchasing some "care" for their child. The author opines that this is a
form of child abuse-causing harm to a child in order to gratify parentsand, perhaps stating the obvious, contends that "the infant's interests
266
should absolutely supersede those of his or her parents."

E.

Non-medical reasons including social concerns and religion
cannot justify parental permission for circumcision

Many parents choose circumcision for their sons not because they
mistakenly believe it is medically beneficial, but rather for non-medical
reasons. Most common is a concern that their son may have social
difficulties if his genitals do not look exactly like those of his father and
267
those of the majority of his peers.
This claimed social benefit for the
child is both unsupported and insufficient to justify a non-consensual
surgical intervention. It is unsupported because there is no evidence that
intact boys undergo any greater social difficulties as a result of the
difference between their genitals and those of their fathers or peers. If
there were any such risk, any competent parent could easily deal with this

264. See EDWARD WALLERSTEIN, CiRCUMCISION: AN AMERICAN HEALTH
fALLACY 131 (1980).
265. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 131, at 314.
266. See Dale L. Moore, Challenging Parental Decisions to Overtreat
Children, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 311, 320 (1995).
267. See Mark S. Brown & Cheryl A. Brown, Circumcision Decision:
Prominence of Social Concerns, 80 PEDIATRICS 215, 216, 217 (1987); see generally
John E. Lovell & James Cox, Maternal Attitudes Toward Circumcision, 9 J. FAM.
PRAC. 811 (1979). It should be noted that the circumcision rate is already below
50% in a number of states such as California and a number of American ethnic
cultures and demographic groups. People of Latino descent, for example, rarely
circumcise their male children even if born in the United States. See Herzog, supra
note 146, at 254; see generally Dimitri A. Christakis et al., A Trade-off Analysis of
Routine Newborn Circumcision, 105 PEDIATRICS 246 (2000).
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by explaining to their son that his genitals are natural and those of his
father and some of his peers were surgically altered when they were
babies. These "social concerns" are not sufficient enough to violate the
physical integrity of a non-consenting person.
A small percentage of North American parents choose circumcision for
religious reasons, and our society is uncomfortable criticizing or
countermanding parents who act for their children on the basis of deeply
held convictions. As discussed supra in Part I.D., it is a mistake, however,
for physicians to believe that parents have a right to make their religious
beliefs controlling on the question of whether a child is to undergo a nonmedically indicated surgical procedure. No court has ever held that
parents have a first amendment right to have unnecessary medical
procedures performed on their children. ro give that power gratuitously
to certain parents because they have particular religious beliefs would be
to violate one of their children's constitutional and moral rights-the right
to equal protection. If the state and the medical profession protect some
children against medically inappropriate practices, they must protect
against all medically inappropriate practices unless they can demonstrate
that denying that protection to some children would be better for those
268
children (who themselves have no religious beliefs).
As the Supreme
Court has stated, parents are free to make martyrs of themselves but not
269
to make martyrs of their children. In other words, parents are not free
to force their children to undergo unnecessary and harmful surgery,
however well intentioned they might be. A United Kingdom family court
recently endorsed the principle that at least where two parents of two
different religions disagreed on whether to circumcise, and where a local
authority exercising parental responsibility under a care order, a
circumcision could not be ordered. The court noted that mainstream
medical opinion in the United Kingdom requires both paternal and
270
maternal consent to a circumcision.
F.

Informed Consent

Finally, even if non-medically indicated surgery such as circumcision

268. See supra Part !II.B.
269. See generally Dwyer, supra note 3, at 1365-1465.
270. See Re J (Child's Religious Upbringing and Circumcision), [1999] 2
F.L.R. 678 (Fam. Div.), affirmed, [2000] 1 F.L.R. 571 (C.A.). The Family Division
decision is also available at http://www.butterworths.co.uk/academic/fortin
/cases/Re_J.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2000).
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were legally and ethically permissible to perform on children, parental
authorization for such surgery would still have to comport with the
requirements of informed consent. As previously discussed, there are
three basic requirements to informed consent: 1) disclosure of all relevant
and material information; 2) verifying and fostering the capacity of the
decision-maker; and 3) ensuring that the decision is voluntary.
1.

Disclosure

Physicians are always under a legal and ethical duty to fully disclose to
the decision-maker all available information regarding a proposed
procedure. Because the duty requires all available information and not
just the information a given physician happens to have acquired to be
disclosed, physicians are under a duty to acquire all available information
pertinent to a surgery that they perform. Physicians who perform
circumcisions, therefore, have a legal and ethical duty to their infant
patients to obtain and provide to the patients' parents all available
medical information regarding circumcision. This includes all pertinent
available information about the nature and function of the foreskin, the
pain that infants incur when it is removed, the risk of complications from
the surgery, and any possible medical benefits and costs that may result
from having it removed. A medical practitioner who fails to completely
disclose the potential physical costs (and, presumably, other
271
disadvantages) of a procedure is negligent.
a.

Nature and purpose of the foreskin

Recent articles in leading medical journals have documented the
272
foreskin's complex structure. Although the foreskin has been described
273
as "the fold of skin covering the glans," it is actually a complex,
junctional tissue similar to the eyelids or the lips. It is designed to protect
274
the glans of the penis, an internal structure, from trauma and infection.
It also contains the highest concentration of fine-touch neuroreceptors in
the penis. Only lips and fingertips have comparable neuroreceptor

271. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,167, 170 (1943).
272. See generally In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988); see also
Etchells et al., supra note 16, at 178; David Richards, Male Circumcision: Medical
or Ritual?, 3 J. L. & MED. 371, 374 (1996).
273. See generally Taylor, supra note 240, at 291; Cold, supra note 246, at 34.
274. See American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 143, at 388.
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275

densities. By contrast, the glans is a neurologically dumb organ. Due to
the foreskin's rich abundance in neuroreceptors and its exquisite
specialization as a producer of sexual pleasure, it may, in fact, be the most
276
sensitive part of the infant male's body.
Parents also need to be aware that the anatomically complete penis'
involuting structure allows for erection without tightening of the skin over
the penile shaft. During coitus the complete skin system of the penis,
including the foreskin, allows for non-traumatic intromission and penile
277
movement within the vaginal vault without chafing. Physicians owe a
duty to infant male patients to inform their parents of the functionality
and sensitivity that their sons will lose for a lifetime if a circumcision is
carried out.

b.

Pain

Physicians have an obligation to be forthright with parents about the
pain that infants endure when their foreskin is removed surgically.
Evidence suggests that physicians rarely do so, and this omission is clearly
unethical. Many physicians may neglect to discuss the pain with parents
because they fear it will be disturbing for the parents. But it should be
disturbing, and physicians owe a duty to the infant patient to make his
parents aware of this disquieting aspect of circumcision. Physicians have a
further obligation to make parents aware that adequate and safe
anesthesia is not available during the neonatal period. They owe no duty
to parents to make them feel better about granting permission for an
unnecessary surgery.

c.

Risk of Complications

Because healthy, richly innervated, erogenous tissue is removed with
every circumctston, the complication rate of circumcision-if
"complication" means harmful effect- arguably is 100% because it denies
the patient the use and function of this specialized tissue. As mentioned
above, the risk of additional immediate complication is between 2% and

275. See Fleiss et al., supra note 243, at 364.
276. See generally Taylor, supra note 240, at 291; Zdenek Halata & Bryce L.

Munger, The Neuroanatomical Basis for the Protopathic Sensibility of the Human
Glans Penis, 371 BRAIN RES. 205-30 (1986); M.Von Frey, Beitraege zur
Physiologie des Schmerzsinns. Zweite Mitt, 46 AKAD WISS LEIPZIG MATH
NATURWISS KL BER 283-96 (1984).
277. See Cold, supra note 246, at 41.
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278

10%.
The danger of a later complication, such as meatal stenosis,
represents an additional 5% to 10% likelihood of a harmful
279
complication. Many of the potential immediate and later complications
can be quite severe. Physicians are clearly obligated to make parents
aware of these complication rates and the nature of the harms that might
befall their son.

d.

No Significant Medical Benefits

No significant medical benefit has clearly been demonstrated to result
from routine neonatal circumcision, and physicians have a duty to inform
parents of that fact.
As discussed below, studies purporting to
demonstrate prophylactic health benefits have fatal flaws in their design
and/or focus on maladies that' are extremely rare - much rarer than the
280
complications that results from circumcision itself. At best, these studies
demonstrate the truism that amputation of healthy tissue can marginally
reduce the rate of maladies afflicting the organ from which it was taken,
simply because less tissue is available to contract a condition. Naturally,
routine prophylactic amputation in children has never been entertained as
an ethically or scientifically viable medical procedure. When the
proposed benefits and real costs are aggregated, as in a cost-utility
281
analysis, the proposed benefits are insufficient-to counter the real costs.
A physician who states that neonatal circumcision helps these illnesses
without stating that any potential benefits are far outweighed by the real
harm perpetrated violates his or her duty to provide accurate, complete
information.

e.

Are physicians adequately disclosing this information?

Evidence of actual practice reveals that physicians who perform
circumcisions themselves know next to nothing about the part of the body
that they are removing. A 1975 survey revealed that 47% of physicians
who perform circumcisions believed that a non-retractable foreskin in a
newborn was an indication for circumcision, when it is perfectly normal

278. See K. O'Hara & J. O'Hara, The Effect of Male Circumcision on the
Sexual Enjoyment of the Female Partner, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 79-84 (1999).
279. SeeN. Williams & L. Kapila, Complications of Circumcision, 80 BRIT. J.
SURGERY 1231 (1993).
280. See Patel, supra note 225, at 576; Griffiths, supra note 227, at 184; Persad,
supra note 227, at 91.
281. See discussion Part IV.A and IV.B.
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and healthy for a newborn's foreskin to be non-retractable and for the
282
foreskin to become retractable only as a boy approaches adolescence.
There is little evidence that physician knowledge has improved ·since
283
then.
The misinformation promulgated regarding the painfulness of
circumcision is unconscionable. Parents who cringe when their baby's
heel is pricked for a blood sample are led to believe that their son feels
little or no pain when a large part of his penis is cut off. This may be
because parents typically believe that anesthesia is used even when it is
not, or that if a local anesthesia is in fact used, the anesthesia is highly
effective when it is not.
With respect to the risk of complications and the supposed medical
benefits associated with circumcision, studies reveal that physicians underreport the risks and exaggerate the supposed benefits. A 1987 study
found that physicians routinely inform parents about only a small
minority of the medical complications and risks associated with elective
284
circumcisions. The common practice is to mention only pain, infection
285
and bleeding as complications of neonatal circumcision. This is far
below the standard level of disclosure for other surgeries, whether
medically indicated or cosmetic. The physician should disclose each of
the many potential complications mentioned above, addressing the risks
of serious bodily harm and even death, the probability of "success," and
the alternatives to circumcision, and any risks associated with these
alternatives. A study has shown, however, that physicians do not do
286
this. When selecting which medical complications to mention to parents,
physicians tend to use a subjective assessment of the frequency and
seriousness of complications. The study revealed that the physicians'
probability estimates were inaccurately low and that their assessments of

. 282. See Ganiats, supra note 262, at 282; Task Force on Circumcision, supra
note 256, at 686.
283. See generally Martin T. Stein et al., Routine Neonatal Circumcision: The
Gap between Contemporary Policy and Practice, 15 J. FAM. PRAC. 47 (1982).
284. See generally Christopher R. Fletcher, Circumcision in America in 1998:
Attitudes, Beliefs, and Charges of Am. Physicians, in MALE AND FEMALE
CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC
PRACTICE, 259 (George C. Denniston, Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F. Milos
eds. 1999).
285. See Jay J. Christensen-Szalanski et al., Circumcision and Informed
Consent. Is More Information Always Better? 25 MED. CARE 856, 856-67 (1987).
286. See Fletcher, supra note 284, at 259.
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the seriousness of potential complications were consistently lower than
2%1
those expressed by mothers of newborn sons.
There are many reasons why physicians provide inadequate
information. Many who discuss the surgery with the mother postpartum
assume that the arguments for and against circumcision have already been
discussed with a health care provider. Those who meet with the parents
well in advance of the birth may simply feel too busy to properly discuss
the pros and cons with the parents, and may not have equipped
themselves with the literature necessary to adequately present the facts to
the parents.
Compliance with the medical profession's ethical
requirement for obtaining true informed consent is a time-consuming,
laborious process. Doubtless, wherever they can, many physicians will cut
corners on such a task, especially where, as with circumcision, they may
believe some parents would prefer not to learn the full truth regarding
288
The current perception that circumcision is
potential complications.
"just a little snip" and the cultural prejudice that a child's physical
integrity is less important than an adult's physical integrity makes it easier
to justify bypassing a full disclosure.
In addition, physicians may simply feel uncomfortable fully discussing
with parents the risks of circumcision. Furthermore, many parents choose
circumcision for non-medical reasons. Likewise, many physicians see
circumcision as a cultural, not a medical, practice. Physicians may believe
that discussing the possible complications with parents is more likely to
upset the parents than to influence the parents' decision. Parental
289
The easiest
hostility following complete disclosure is not uncommon.
path, in terms of the physician's own comfort, is to provide sparse
information, because the parents will still sign the "consent form" without
becoming angry with the provider. Physicians may wish to appease the
parents because the parents decide who will provide medical care for their
child, and sometimes the fear of losing patients may override the duty to
do what is in the best interest of the child.
Edward Etchells et al. suggest that physicians base the content of their
discussions with the parents on the perceived motives of each set of
parents:
If the parents' decision is based on strong cultural beliefs and
practices, a detailed, impersonal disclosure of all known risks

287. See Christensen-Szalansk, supra note 285, at 856.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 864.
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and benefits would probably not be relevant or helpful.
However, if the decision is based on personal experiences (e.g.,
the father was circumcised), a detailed discussion of the risks
and benefits would be useful in helping the parents come to a
290
decision.
This approach is simply untenable. Obvious practical and ethical
difficulties are created by an approach that requires physicians to
determine parental motives and to provide widely diverging types and
levels of information depending on this determination.
More
fundamentally, the authors fail to explain how parental motive alters the
risks, the benefits, the treatment options, or the physician's duty to the
patient, i.e., the child, to give full disclosure. Tellingly, physicians'
positions regarding circumcision are inconsistent with their positions on
291
therapeutic privilege and substitute consent for adult incompetent
292
patients. This suggests a failure to accord proper respect to the interests
and rights of the children who are the patients and an improper focus on
the interests and desires of parents. The extent of information that
parents actually want or feel comfortable receiving is legally and ethically
irrelevant to the physician's duty of disclosure.
The misleading presentation medical personnel typically give to parents
may also result from a failure to seek out available information. Three
years after the release of the 1975 AAP Task Force on Circumcision
report, which stated that "[t]here is no absolute medical indication for
293
routine circumcision of the newborn," only 49% of Chicago area
pediatricians, obstetricians and family practitioners were aware of the
294
AAP's position.
At that time, 41% recommended routine infant
circumcision despite the AAP report, while only 15% recommended the
295
infants forego the practice.
The frequency of routine circumcision in
Chicago area hospitals (70% to 90%) remained unchanged in the three
296
years following the AAP's statement. Another study in 1975 analyzed a
randomly selected group of 92 primary care physicians and 103 parents of

290. See id.
291. See Edward Etchells et al., Consent for Circumcision, 156 CAN. MED.
Ass'NJ.17, 18 (1997).
292. See Etchells, supra note 32, at 389.
293. See Lazar, supra note 76, at 1437.
294. See Thompson, supra note 255, at 611.
295. See Daksha A. Patel et al., Factors Affecting the Practice of Circumcision,
136 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 634 (1982).
296. /d.
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297

male infants. Despite the contents of the 1975 AAP report, 65% of the
physicians conveyed a positive attitude about routine neonatal
298
circumcision to their patients. Although pediatricians were more likely
to have a neutral attitude, both family and general practitioners were
299
more likely to favor routine neonatal circumcision.
A particular physician's attitude towards circumcision may derive more
from the result of personal experience and cultural background than from
careful study of the medical literature. A physician's gender and
circumcision status, for example, appear to affect whether he or she
promotes or discourages circumcision. One study found that 100% of the
health care providers surveyed who encouraged circumcision were male,
300
while 81% of those discouraging the surgery were female.
Another
survey found that circumcised physicians were more likely to favor
301
circumcision than those not circumcised.
Physicians asked to
summarize their opinions regarding circumcision offered a wide variety of
opinions, ranging from "personally I appreciated the cosmetic effect" to
302
"barbaric ritual perpetuated for irrational reasons."
The Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association instructs
physicians to "inform [their] patient[s] when [their] personal morality
would influence the recommendation or practice of any medical
procedure the patient needs or wants" and to indicate when their opinion
303
is contrary to the generally held position of the profession.
This is
undoubtedly sound practice. It suggests that a physician who belongs to a
religion that requires male circumcision should disclose this during any
discussion with a patient or parent regarding circumcision. Likewise, a
physician who recommends neonatal circumcision has an obligation to
state, depending on what country he is practicing in, that his national
medical organization does not recommend neonatal circumcision. . As
with any ineffective, outdated treatment, physicians have a sound basis for
304
refusing to perforin neonatal circumcision.

297. /d.
298. See Stein, supra note 283, at 47.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See Ciesielski-Carlucci et al., supra note 5, at 231.
302. See Stein et al., supra note 283, at 48, 49 (odds ratio = 9.46, 95%
confidence interval = 1.70- 52.71).
303. See Ciesielski-Carlucci, supra note 5, at 234.
304. See Canadian Medical Association, supra note 38, at 1176A-B.
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Physicians' failure to adequately inform themselves about circumcision
and to pass on all acquired relevant information is reflected in the level of
parental knowledge about circumcision when parents give permission for
the surgery. A 1979 study surveyed two hundred mothers to determine
305
Of
their attitudes toward and knowledge of neonatal circumcision.
those that were either doctors or other health care providers, 95%
circumcised their sons. Although the mothers offered a wide variety of
reasons for granting permission, few of these reasons. had any medical
validity (let alone sufficient weight to actually make their decision
rational). Eighty-seven percent of mothers considered circumcision to be
without risk of complications, and 80% of mothers stated that no
306
physician ever explained the risks to them. A 1996 study revealed that
35% of mothers who gave permission for circumcision of their sons
307
believed that neonatal circumcision had no risks involved. Twenty-five
percent of the women in this study believed they had not been given
' formation.
. 308
enough m
Finally, the physician is obligated to disclose all personal interests
unrelated to the patient's health that he or she may have when obtaining
309
consent to medical treatment.
The Supreme Court of California held
that a cause of action for lack of informed consent exists where a
physician fails to disclose, prior to obtaining the patient's consent to
remove his spleen, that the physician has made arrangements to use
portions of the spleen for economically beneficial medical research
310
purposes.
In the circumcision context, there arises a particularly egregious, if
relatively rare, application of this principle that has drawn significant
media attention in recent years - the harvesting of foreskins from living
babies and the subsequent use of the foreskins for profit by the medical
311
industry. Clearly such use of foreskins taken from living donors should
be prohibited even with parental permission, because it is not related in
any way to the circumcision itself and the affected infant male cannot

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See Weijer, supra note 95, at 817.
See Lovell & Cox, supra note 267, at 812.
See id.
See Ciesielski-Carlucci, supra note 5, at 235.
See id.
See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
See id. at 483.
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312

possibly consent to this use of his formerly healthy, functional tissue. In
fact, two American Medical Association (AMA) policy statements appear
to explicitly bar such a practice. AMA Policy E-2.08 on "Commercial Use
of Human Tissue," requires informed consent from patients for the use of
organs or tissues in clinical research, mandates disclosure of potential
commercial applications prior to realizing a profit on products developed
from biological materials, prohibits the use of human tissue and its
products for commercial purposes without the prior informed consent of
the patient providing the original cellular material, and demands that
diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives offered to patients conform to
standards of good medical practice and be free of influence in any way by
313
the commercial potential of the patient's tissue.
AMA Policy E-2.167
on "The Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue Donors" requires that all
such use have parental approval, that a "clear benefit" to the minor exist,
that the minor be the only available source of the tissue, and that minors
314
be allowed to serve as sources of tissue only for close family members.
Medical applications of foreskins harvested from live donors are also
forbidden under international law pursuant to the European Convention
315
on Human Rights and Biomedicine.
Even if such use of circumcised
312. See Karen Wright, Ready-to-wear Flesh, DISCOVER, Nov. 1999, at 46, 46;
David J. Mooney & Antonios G. Mikos, Growing New Organs, Sci. AM., April
1999, at 60, 60 (describing work constructing Apligraf skin product using living
human foreskin cells); Roger A. Pedersen, Embryonic Stem Cells for Medicine,
SCI. AM., April1999, at 68-69,71 (detailing Advanced Tissue Sciences' creation of
skin construct Dermagraft from discarded foreskins taken from newborn babies);
Skin Paved the Way for Tissue Engineering, USA TODAY, Aug. 12,1997, available
at http://ithaca.rice.edu/kz/USAToday/skinarticle.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2000);
B. Manson, Forget Pork Bellies, Now It's Foreskins, SAN DIEGO READER, May 4,
1995 at 255; M.E. Meulders-Klein, The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and
Limits in Comparative Law, 6 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 29,48 (1983) ("any act
which tends to demean even a consenting person is radically illicit and a fortiori if
the act is, in addition, immoral and profit-oriented").
313. See AMA Policy, E-2.08 Commercial Use of Human Tissue, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_online (last visited Sept. 4, 2000).
314. See AMA Policy, E-2.167 The Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue
Donors, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_online (last visited Sept. 4,
2000).
315. See Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 164, Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to
the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine (April 4, 1997), available at http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/164e.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2000). Article 19 generally prohibits non-therapeutic removal
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foreskins were ethical, physicians would certainly have an obligation to
disclose that potential conflict of interests to parents.

2.

Capacity

Medical personnel have a duty to the newborn child to ensure that
parental surrogates have the capacity to make a rational, reflective
decision about circumcision. They should fully disclose all relevant
information about the procedure well in advance of the birth, and then
evaluate whether the parents understood the information. If the parents
do not appear to understand, the physician should attempt to convey the
information in another way that is clearer to the parents. Some
researchers have contended that parents are less rational in medical
decisions concerning their children than they are in medical decisions
316
concerning themselves.
Medical personnel may therefore have a
heightened duty when dealing with parental surrogates to ensure the
surrogate is capable of making a rational decision on behalf of the infant
patient.
Several studies have looked into different media for presenting
information to parents about circumcision and what effect each would
have on the likelihood of parents giving permission. A survey of obstetric
clinic patients in a large urban hospital showed that oral communication
of the risks involved would significantly reduce the rate of circumcision
(72% in the study group versus 94.4% in the control group). The authors
concluded that mothers in the population they studied requested
circumcision for their sons because of inadequate medical information or
317
strong social motives. Another study showed that videotape counseling
modestly reduced parental peqnission for circumcision when compared
with standard oral counseling (70.5% versus 75.9%, 0R=0.76, 95%,
Cl=0.61-0.94). Prior to the study, the circumcision rate at that medical

of organs or tissue from a living person for transplantation purposes. Article 20
bars organ or tissue removal from a person without the capacity to consent, with
certain limited exceptions not applicable here. Article 21 prohibits using the
human body and its parts to give rise to financial gain. Article 22 provides that
when in the course of an intervention any human body part is removed, it may be
stored and used for a purpose other than that for which it was removed only if this
is done in conformity with appropriate information and consent procedures.
316. See Alderson, supra note 18, at 106.
317. See Cynthia S. Rand et al., The Effect of an Educational Intervention on
the Rate of Neonatal Circumcision, 62 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 64, 64 (1983).

128

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

[Vol. 17:61

318

center was 90.4%.
Parents may actually be resistant to receiving information about
circumcision, and that would certainly diminish their capacity to
understand what is presented. One study of oral provision of information
to mothers about risks had to be suspended when many mothers became
upset and several expressed their unwillingness to have the physician who
319
The
provided the information care for their children in the future.
obstetrical nurses were also belligerent to the physician who provided the
mothers with oral information, because the physician was upsetting their
320
patients.
Parents are often irritated by any discussion of circumcision
321
because their minds are already made up. Told that circumcision carries
the risk of penile amputation, serious life-threatening infection, and
death, parents find their self-esteem challenged by this information,
because they do not want to unnecessarily place their children at risk
while at the same time often being unwilling to rethink a decision they
have already made. In short, they do not want to be confused or unsettled
by the facts. As noted previously, the physician's obligation is to the
child, not to the parent, and that obligation includes a duty to overcome
parental resistance and ensure that parents receive, understand, and take
322
into account all of the facts.
Otherwise, their permission for
circumcision of their infant cannot be effective.

3.

Voluntariness

The voluntariness requirement demands that physicians provide
information regarding circumcision to parents in an unbiased fashion well
in advance of the birth and that physicians do not themselves propose the
procedure to parents. To ensure that any parents who are predisposed to
request circumcision receive full disclosure in advance of the birth, the
physician might tell parents that he or she will assume, unless the parents
indicate otherwise, that the baby is not to be circumcised. If the subject
first arises at the time of birth, or if parents do not receive the relevant
information about the procedure until the time of birth, the physician
should refuse to perform the circumcision until such time as the parents

318. See Robert W. Enzenauer et al., Decreased Circumcision Rate with
Videotaped Counseling, 79 S. MED. J. 717,718 (1986).
319. See Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 285, at 856-67.
320. /d.
321. See E.B. Feehan, Letter to the Editor, 60 PEDIATRICS 566 (1977).
322. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 131, at 314-16.
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have been able to review the information fully and demonstrate to the
physician that they understand the information. One group of physicians
has suggested simply waiting twelve hours after birth before asking
parents about circumcision, in order to provide an opportunity to discuss
323
the procedure's advantages and disadvantages with the parents.
However, given the tremendous psychological and physical impact of
becoming a parent, this waiting period is inadequate to allow the parent
sufficient opportunity to absorb and analyze information regarding the
circumcision procedure before making a decision. Some writers have
questioned whether, given the perinatal emotional upheaval, parental
324
permission can ever be truly free and informed in the neonatal context.
Indeed, one author (Svoboda) has accumulated a significant number of
consent forms for neonatal circumcision, not a single one of which
adequately discloses all significant risks to the procedure in a manner
parallel to the disclosures which are commonly made for other
•
325
surgenes.
Unfortunately, current practice appears inconsistent with the
voluntariness requirement as well. It is routine in the United States to ask
a woman during one of the initial prenatal visits whether she desires
326
circumcision for her child if it is a boy.
As noted above, offering a
327
medically unnecessary surgery such as circumcision is unethical.
It is
also a subtle form of coercion; offering circumcision to a mother can easily
328
be interpreted as a recommendation.
Mothers are left with the
impression that "it must be the thing to do, or our doctor would not have
329
told us about it. "

323. See generally A .G.M. Campbell et a!., Circumcision: A Balanced Report
Based on Facts, Not Conjecture, 5 PATIENT CARE 56 (1971 ).
324. See generally S. Mason, Obtaining Informed Consent for Neonatal
Randomized Controlled Trials-An "Elaborate Ritual"? 76 ARCHIVES DISEASE
CHILDHOOD F143 (1997).
325. Sample consent forms on file at the journal's office.
326. See R.S. Van Howe, Why Does Neonatal Circumcision Persist in the
United States?, in SEXUAL MUTILATIONS: A HUMAN TRAGEDY 111 (G.C.
Denniston & M.F. Milos eds. 1997).
327. See AMA, supra note 37, at 105; Canadian Medical Association, supra
note 38, at 1176A.
328. See Van Howe, supra note 326, at 234; A. BRIGGS, CiRCUMCISION: WHAT
EVERY PARENT SHOULD KNOW, 133-53 (1985).
329. See generally D. Hovsepian, The Pros & Cons of Routine Circumcision,
75 CALMED. 360 (1951).
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Even more troubling is the common occurrence of parents being
presented with the circumcision question for the first time when a mother
is in labor at a hospital. Surgeon George Kaplan notes that "all too often
the consent to circumcise is included in a sheaf of papers that the mother
signs hurriedly on her way to the delivery room. No discussion has been
330
held regarding the merits of the procedure or of the inherent risks."
331
Kaplan characterizes this practice as "inexcusable."
Raising the
circumcision issue for the first time upon the mother's arrival at the
hospital to give birth amounts to manipulation and coercion. Because the
physician and the hospital benefit financially from the parent's decision,
such a practice raises grave concerns about unethical profiteering.
Effective consent to elective, cosmetic surgery cannot arise unless and
until the patient himself is capable of giving it. Infant males are clearly
incapable of giving voluntary consent (and in fact uniformly howl in
protest of the procedure), and without medical necessity and urgency,
there is no justification for looking to a surrogate to give permission.
Unlike cases involving medical necessity for treatment of a child, in the
circumcision context there is simply no predicate for departing from the
general rule that the patient himself must give voluntary consent to any
incursion on his physical integrity by medical professionals. The AAP
Committee on Bioethics sensibly recommends delaying elective, cosmetic
surgery until a child is old enough to give consent, and this would apply to
332
circumcision.
As previously mentioned, the Australian Association of
Pediatric Surgeons has taken this position specifically with respect to
333
334
circumcision,
as have scholars who have considered the issue.
Because, as discussed above, no sufficient reasons exist for not deferring
the procedure, ethically and legally it must be deferred, given the harm
caused by the procedure and the probability that as an adult the patient
will most likely not desire it.
With all the compelling reasons to delay circumcision, it is necessary to
examine why circumcision is performed at such a young age. For many
years, two rationales supported the practice of circumcising right after

330. See generally G .W. Kaplan, Circumcision - An Overview, 7 CURRENT
PROBLEMS PEDIATRICS 1 (1977).
331. See id.
332. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 131, at 315-17.
333. See Leditschke, supra note 248, at 1.
334. See Alderson, supra note 18, at 32.

2000]

Neonatal Circumcision

131

335

birth. First, it was once thought that the newborn could not feel pain.
336
Although this has been proven false, and the opposite - that newborns
actually feel greater pain from the same trauma than do adults - has been
337
proven true, some physicians still blindly adhere to the old myth.
Second, it was regarded as less costly to perform circumcision right after
338
birth because general anesthesia is not used. That rationale might have
some force if the first rationale, that babies feel less or no pain, were true,
but it is hard to imagine any medical professional seriously espousing this
rationale today, when the babies-feel-no-pain myth has been destroyed.
One would expect that medical professionals would not use ineffective
anesthesia on older children and adults simply because it would be
cheaper, and that no parents would knowingly agree to subject their
infant to excruciating pain when that could easily be avoided, simply to
save money.
But old habits die hard in the medical profession. In the case of
children, rationality runs up against an additional obstacle - a pervasive,
unconscious view of children as less than full persons and of childhood as
simply a time to be gotten through, a prelude to adulthood rather than a
period of life having independent worth, which should be as happy a time
as society can make it. Medical personnel possessing this attitude may
decide that pain in infancy is less cause for concern than pain in later life;
adult pain is serious, but infant pain will be gotten over. So it may well be
a lack of respect for newborns as persons and a lack of concern for their
experience rather than any genuine medical rationale that compel
339
physicians to perform circumcision in the neonatal period.

335. M. Fitzgerald & N. Mcintosh, Pain and Analgesia in the Newborn , 64
ARCHIVES OF DISEASES IN CHILDHOOD 441 (1989); see generally Nancy
Wellington & Michael J. Rieder, Attitudes and Practices Regarding Analgesia for
Newborn Circumcision, 92 PEDIATRICS 541 (1993) (finding that 12% of physicians
did not believe that newborns could feel pain and 35% believed that neonates
could not remember pain); William L. Toffler et., Dorsal Penile Nerve Block
during Newborn Circumcision: Underutilization of a Proven Technique? 3 J. OF
THE AMERICAN BOARD OF FAMILY PRACTICE 171 (1990) (concluding that 29% of
physicians did not believe the pain response to circumcision was significant).
336. See Anand & Hickey, supra note 230, at 1326.
337. See generally G .N. Weiss & E.B. Weiss, A Perspective on Controversies
over Neonatal Circumcision, 33 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 726 (1994).
338. See Jayanthi, supra note 198, at 793.
339. See Alderson, supra note 18, at 30.
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CONCLUSION

Infants do not have the capacity to give consent to any aspect of their
medical care. Physicians may. only obtain legally valid permission from
parents to perform procedures on their incompetent children, provided
full disclosure of all material information is made to parents who are able
to understand the. information and to appreciate the consequences of their
decision, and provided that the parents are able to decide whether to
grant their permission free from any manipulation or undue influence.
Moreover, regardless of the motivations and desires of physicians and
parents, the only interventions for which parents may grant their
permission are those conferring benefits that clearly outweigh the shortand long-term costs for the infant patient.
Consent places physicians in a very delicate position, one that is
appropriately governed by stringent ethical norms. Physicians should
approach decision-making on behalf of a newborn with the greatest
caution and with a strong presumption against intrusive procedures.
Amputating a highly sensitive and functional part of the body is extremely
intrusive and should be undertaken only in situations of urgent necessity.
Neonatal circumcision as it is routinely performed in this country clearly
does not satisfy this criterion. It is therefore unethical and unlawful, and
no parental permission for the procedure should be effective. Moreover,
even if it were permissible for physicians to give effect to parental
permission for circumcision, physicians would be under a stringent
obligation to their infant patients to ensure that any such permission is
informed-voluntarily given based upon competent review of all relevant
information. Available evidence suggests that physicians today routinely
fail to fulfill this duty. In doing so, they discredit their profession and
expose themselves to legal liability.
Consent to neonatal circumcision has not been directly considered by
the courts; therefore, our analysis, out of necessity, relies on established
legal precedents of cases that share common elements with neonatal
circumcision. With near uniformity, these precedents indicate that any
consent given for neonatal circumcision would not be valid. Court
340
decisions are in part influenced by the culture in which they occur.
However, circumcision has gradually but steadily been falling out of favor
in the past few decades. When the balance of public opinion shifts to
opposing the practice, the legal system will likely become more accepting
of lawsuits and lobbying for the protection of baby boys. Consequently,
340. See Svoboda, supra note 3, at 206-08.
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the legal system will no longer be able to ignore the conflict between this
practice and the legal and ethical duties of medical professionals. In the
meantime, the medical community ought to hold its members responsible,
and every medical professional should personally reexamine the ethics of
the practice.
The persistence of routine neonatal circumcision in this country may be
explained partly as cultural blindness, a blindness that afflicts medical
professionals as much as it does the general population. Part of the
explanation also lies in a disregard for the distinct personhood and the
dignity of children. The analogy to sterilization of mentally retarded
women is most telling; though once done routinely, primarily to avoid the
social costs of creating wards of the state and of creating more disabled
individuals, sterilization now requires court approval and a strong
showing that it would be medically beneficial to the incompetent woman.
Even in fairly compelling circumstances, courts have denied permission
for sterilization of an incompetent patient. The change came about when
we as a society began to respect the mentally disabled as persons and to
accord them the dignity they are due as persons. We must now do the
same for children, and that will mean ending the practice of routine infant
male circumcision.

